18 NEV. L.J. 919, MARTIN - FINAL

5/30/18 2:08 PM

RESTRAINING FORCED MARRIAGE
Lisa V. Martin*
Although long a component of international women’s human rights platforms, forced marriage is only presently gaining attention as a critical problem in
the United States. In recent years, a number of states have considered legislation
to redress forced and child marriage, most by increasing the minimum age to
marry and/or mandating judicial approval of marriages involving minors. Although civil marriage reform is important, it alone is insufficient to combat
forced marriage. Even where civil marriage is limited to adults, minors remain
vulnerable to forced customary, religious, common law marriages, and marriages consecrated abroad. Further, intended spouses of all ages remain vulnerable
to conduct intended to coerce their consent to marry. To prevent and redress
forced marriage, potential victims need ready access to emergency civil injunctive relief. Civil protection orders are the central civil injunctive remedy relied
upon to address intimate partner violence, rape, and stalking in the United States.
The expedited and flexible remedies of civil protection orders could also help
combat forced marriages; however, common legal standards create barriers to
relief for those vulnerable to forced marriage. This Article is the first to undertake a detailed evaluation of the viability of civil protection orders to prevent and
redress forced marriage. Although protection orders show promise as a tool to
prevent and redress forced marriage in many states, the nuances of the governing
legal standards reduce the practical utility of the remedy for those who lack expert guidance. To enhance the accessibility of protection orders in the context of
forced marriage, this article proposes that states create a new forced marriage
protection order like that established in the United Kingdom to address the specific needs of those facing this problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Sara Tasneem’s father forced her to marry a stranger in a religious ceremony in California when she was fifteen years old. At the time, she had no interest
in marriage. She was focused on school and dreamed of becoming an attorney.
After her marriage, she was taken out of the country, impregnated, and eventually returned to the United States to marry in a civil ceremony.1 Sara’s father
had “an abusive personality,” and she felt unable to defy his plans for her marriage. Had she tried, Sara would have had few options.2
Although long recognized as a social problem at the international level,
forced marriage—a marriage that lacks the consent of one or both spouses—is
only now3 gaining similar attention in the United States.4 No national data ex1

Ms. Tasneem’s is identified only by her first and middle names to protect her from further
issues. David Whiting, California Lacks Minimum Marriage Age, Puts Children in Danger,
ORANGE CTY. REG. (June 15, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/06/15/california-lacksminimum-marriage-age-puts-children-in-danger/ [https://perma.cc/DH9J-ND35].
2
Id.
3
Ramatu Bangura et al., A Closer Look at Forced and Early Marriage in African Immigrant
Communities in New York City, 3 SAUTI YETU OCCASIONAL REP. 1, 1 (2012),
http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/nat-conf-2013/handout-2.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/U5
EQ-425P]; VIDYA SRI & DARAKSHAN RAJA, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE: ADDRESSING
FORCED MARRIAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2013), http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/
carrcenter/files/vidyasri_voicesfromthefrontline.pdf?m=1406738934 [https://perma.cc/JH73X22E].
4
See, e.g., Associated Press, States Make New Push to Curb Child Marriage, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1mOVKm0 [https://perma.cc/ULW8-QXPQ]; Heather Barr,
A Key Step Toward Ending Child Marriage in New York: Governor’s Support of Proposed
Law Boosts Chances of Success, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:59 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/print/300729 [https://perma.cc/9WW6-FQHY]; Lisa W. Foderaro, It’s
Legal for 14-Year-Olds to Marry. Should It Be?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2neZOBe [https://perma.cc/2NHU-DS9C] (describing a case of a fifteenyear-old forced to marry a twenty-one-year-old cousin); Eleanor Goldberg, New York’s
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ists on the extent of the problem in the U.S., but a growing record of quantitative studies and anecdotal accounts indicate that forced marriage is a widespread concern.5 Advocates, individuals subjected to forced and child marriage,
and concerned youth have increased their collective lobbying efforts and
spurred state legislatures to address the problem. Since 2016, twelve states have
considered legislation to further restrict the civil marriage of minors and four
have adopted reforms.6 Although tightening marriage laws has strong symbolic
value and may be an effective remedy for some, civil marriage reform does not
redress the plight of girls like Sara Tasneem, who are forced into marriages in
circumstances that evade state attention. The issuance and denial of marriage
licenses constitutes the state’s primary tool to enforce civil limitations on marChild Marriage ‘Ban’ Still Doesn’t Protect Girls, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2017, 9:01
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-finally-banned-child-marriage_us_59
49738ee4b0e84975504d42 [https://perma.cc/89FT-JLPQ] (criticizing the N.Y. legislation,
saying that it does not go far enough to protect girls from forced marriages); Anna Gronewold, Advocates Demand New York Lawmakers Outlaw Child Marriage, SEATTLE TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2017, 7:50 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/advocates-demandnew-york-lawmakers-outlaw-child-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/2XUX-KUG8]; Shanika
Gunaratna, The “Ugly” Reality of Child Marriage in the U.S., CBS NEWS (May 5, 2017,
3:47 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/child-marriage-in-the-u-s-surprisingly-widespr
ead/ [https://perma.cc/NU9A-9JM7] (highlighting the legality of child marriage in most
states); Nicholas Kristof, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in Florida,
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2r51YnQ [https://perma.cc/878A-T6RN]; Fraidy
Reiss, Why Can 12-Year-Olds Still Get Married in the United States?, WASH. POST (Feb. 10,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/10/why-does-the-uni
ted-states-still-let-12-year-old-girls-get-married/?utm_term=.6d4ca4fce462 [https://perma.c
c/9G23-BMNH]; Anjali Shastry, Va., Md. Weigh Raising Marriage Age to 18 to Combat
Coercion, Abuse, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2016/feb/15/virginia-maryland-weigh-raising-marriage-age-to-18/ [https://perma.cc/RQ7QCRGR] (discussing states who have legislation to raise marriage age minimums on the
books); Alison Thoet, New Jersey Lawmakers Pass Bill Banning Child Marriage, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar, 14, 2017, 3:58 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/new-jerseyjust-became-first-state-completely-ban-child-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/YAC4-L38B] (discussing New Jersey’s law raising the age requirement of marriage to 18); Anjali Tsui, In
Fight over Child Marriage Laws, States Resist Calls for a Total Ban, PBS FRONTLINE (July
6, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-fight-over-child-marriage-laws-statesresist-calls-for-a-total-ban/ [https://perma.cc/M4TM-UF6E] (discussing different approaches
to child marriage legislation); Debra Cassens Weiss, US Laws Have Allowed Children as
Young as 12 to Get Married, A.B.A J. (Feb. 14, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.abajour
nal.com/news/article/us_laws_have_allowed_children_as_young_as_12_to_get_married [ht
tps://perma.cc/M2FA-5KE2] (pointing out that the laws allow for 12-year-olds to marry);
Whiting, supra note 1.
5
See infra Part I.
6
See infra Section I.G. Although the nominal age of marriage is eighteen in most states,
numerous exceptions permit minors to marry with parental consent or judicial approval under certain circumstances. Understanding State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Exceptions, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., 1 (2016), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
11/FINAL-State-Marriage-Age-Requirements-Statutory-Compilation-PDF.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/JLG6-E528].
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riage before marriages occur. Yet, although marriage licenses are required or at
least useful in many states to ensure that spouses have access to the legal rights
and protections conferred upon married couples, marriage licenses are not required for religious or customary marriage ceremonies to take place, nor for
marriages ceremonies to occur abroad. Armed with advanced knowledge of her
impending religious marriage ceremony, Sara needed access to legal relief to
prevent her father from orchestrating her marriage and removal from the country. To pursue such relief, Sara would have needed to know that a remedy existed and that she could qualify, and, especially given her age and maturity, she
would have needed to know where to turn for help.
No civil legal remedies designed to prevent or intervene in a forced marriage currently exist in the United States.7 Most community-based organizations lack programs and services relating to forced marriage, and may not know
how to respond if approached for help.8 These gaps in services and the law
leave girls like Sara at the mercy of those determined to force them into marriages.
Civil protection orders have emerged as the central legal remedy in the
United States to address a number of forms of gender-based violence, including
domestic and dating abuse, sexual assault, and stalking.9 As forced marriage
continues to emerge as another form of violence against women and girls,10 the
time is ripe to evaluate the viability of civil protection orders to combat forced
7

See, e.g., Julia Alanen, Custom or Crime?: Part III of IV: Crafting a Competent Framework to Combat Forced Marriage, 30 AM. J. FAM. L. 121, 121 (2016); ANGELA VIGIL,
A.B.A. COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 5 (2014) [hereinafter VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE].
8
HEATHER HEIMAN & JEANNE SMOOT, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., FORCED MARRIAGE IN
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS 5
(2011).
9
See infra Section II.A.
10
Although forced marriage is recognized as a form of violence rooted in gender inequality
and predominantly inflicted upon women and girls, it is important to note that men also experience this problem. In the United Kingdom, requests for assistance from male victims
comprised 20 percent of the government’s Forced Marriage Unit caseload in 2016, 20 percent in 2015, and 21 percent in 2014. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FORCED
MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS 2016, at 3 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/597869/Forced_Marriage_Unit_statistics-_2016.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/78S3-MMBS] [hereinafter UK Statistics 2016]; FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS 2015, at 3 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/gov
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505827/Forced_Marriage_Unit_stat
istics_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E8K-R2FR]; FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
FORCED
MARRIAGE
UNIT
STATISTICS
JANUARY
TO
DECEMBER
2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412667/FMU
_Stats_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/93AJ-Q5VK]; see also EDWIGE RUDE-ANTOINE, COUNCIL
OF EUR: DIRECTORATE GEN. OF HUM. RTS., FORCED MARRIAGES IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE
MEMBER STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL INITIATIVES 23
(2005), http://eige.europa.eu/resources/CDEG(2005)1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/F972-ERVL]
(describing male victims of forced marriage in France).
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marriage.11 This Article undertakes a detailed analysis of the efficacy of civil
protection orders in this context, and offers a preventive solution to the growing
problem of forced marriage.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the problem of forced
marriage in the United States, including its causes and consequences, as well as
recent state legislative responses and possible channels for legal intervention.
This analysis identifies civil protection orders as the existing legal remedy with
the most promise to prevent forced marriages. Part II evaluates in detail the viability of civil protection orders to prevent and intervene in forced marriages.
This Part identifies four features of protection order statutes that determine
their utility in the forced marriage context: the designations of qualifying relationships and qualifying conduct, the treatment of minor petitioners, and the
range of remedies that courts may include in approved orders. Part II concludes
that under certain circumstances, civil protection orders could be effective at
combatting forced marriages in many states. Yet, protection order statutes are
an imperfect fit for forced marriage, and would exclude many at-risk individuals from relief. Consequently, Part III proposes that states adopt a new injunctive remedy specifically crafted to address forced marriage—forced marriage
protection orders. Modeled from the remedy adopted in the United Kingdom,
forced marriage protection orders would center the court’s inquiry on whether a
petitioner was facing or had experienced a forced marriage, and would empower courts to tailor remedies to the needs of each petitioner. By moving away
from a criminal paradigm, adopting a proactive orientation, incorporating a petitioner-centered perspective, and explicitly extending the remedy to minors,
forced marriage protection orders also would represent a new evolution in civil
injunctive relief that could redress many critiques raised of civil protection orders, and provide a model for reform of those laws. Finally, Part III recognizes
and responds to potential concerns with the feasibility, enforceability, and desirability of creating forced marriage protection orders. I conclude that the potential benefits of targeted relief outweigh the potential drawbacks of failing to
restrain forced marriage.
I.

FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Definitions
The right to choose the timing of one’s marriage and the identity of one’s
spouse is widely recognized as a universal human right.12 The United States

11

Elizabeth M. Landau, Custom or Crime?: Part II of IV: Legal Remedies for Forced Marriage Victims and Survivors, 30 AM. J. FAM. L. 46, 50 (2016) (suggesting protection orders
as a possible remedy); Julia Alanen, Shattering the Silence Surrounding Forced and Early
Marriage in the United States, 32 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 12 (2012) (same).
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Supreme Court has firmly established marriage as a fundamental constitutional
right and a protected relationship, and has held that personal decisions relating
to marriage are protected by the due process clause.13 As marriage is at its essence a contract,14 consent is central to a marriage’s legal validity.15
Forced marriages lack “the full and free consent of one or both parties and
typically [involve] force, fraud, or coercion.”16 Forced marriage is a problem in
its own right, and it overlaps with other exertions of power and control within
personal and family relationships. Forced marriage has been recognized as a

12

See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommendation No. 21 (1994), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recom
m.htm#recom19 [https://perma.cc/5CX8-2QJV] [hereinafter Recommendation 21] (“A
woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her life and to
her dignity and equality as a human being.”); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 16(1) (Dec. 18, 1979) (“State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women: . . . The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into
marriage only with their free and full consent. . . .”); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1) (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Marriage
must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.”); G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23(3) (Dec. 16, 1966) (“No
marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”);
G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(2) (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”).
13
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2534, 2599 (2015) (holding that the Court has long held
the right to marry is in the due process clause, in part, because, “the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)
(relying on Loving to hold that a requirement that fathers with outstanding child support obligations must secure judicial permission to remarry unconstitutionally infringed on the fundamental right to marry). See generally SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 32–35
(2d ed. 2015) (summarizing U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing marriage as a fundamental right); Natalie Nanasi, An “I Do” I Choose: How the Fight for Marriage Access
Supports a Per Se Finding of Persecution for Asylum Cases Based on Forced Marriage, 28
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 48, 74–80 (2014) (same).
14
KATZ, supra note 13, at 29–31.
15
Id. at 37–40; Nanasi, supra note 13, at 73–74.
16
Casey Swegman, The Intersectionality of Forced Marriage with Other Forms of Abuse in
the
United
States,
VAWNET.ORG
1
(2016)
http://www.tahirih.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/AR_ForcedMarriage.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JP9-EPDE]; see also
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE: A WRONG NOT A RIGHT ch. 1
(2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080305143653/http://www.fco.gov.uk/
Files/kfile/forcedmarriageconsultation%20doc.pdf [http://perma.cc/JLR9-UGU3] [hereinafter A WRONG NOT A RIGHT]; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 2; see also sources cited supra note 12.
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form of domestic abuse, a form of honor violence, and a violation of human
rights.17
Forced marriages differ from arranged marriages, which remain “a longstanding tradition in many cultures and countries.”18 “In arranged marriages,
the families of both spouses take a leading role in arranging the marriage but
the choice whether to accept the arrangement remains with the individual.”19
Forced marriages also differ from child or “early” marriages, in which one or
both spouses is a minor.20
The presence or absence of consent distinguishes arranged from forced
marriages, and forced from child marriages. But the boundaries between these
different marriage categories sometimes blur.21 Because consent is personal to
the individual and individuals may be unclear about their feelings, it can be difficult for those on the outside to identify a marriage as forced.
As another example of overlap between these marriage categories, spousal
age is a central concern in forced marriage prevention efforts. Forced marriage
concerns relating to spousal age include that: a significant number of forced

17

See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommendation No. 19, Comment Articles 2(f), 5 and
10(c) (1992), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.ht
m#recom19 [https://perma.cc/5CX8-2QJV] (“Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices
involving violence or coercion, such as . . . forced marriage. . . . Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women. The effect
of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of women is to deprive them the equal
enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”). The U.S.
State Department recognizes forced marriage as “a violation of basic human rights,” and “a
form of child abuse,” when a minor is involved. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL (FAM): FORCED MARRIAGE OF MINORS 1741(a) (2005), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/
07FAM/07FAM1740.html [https://perma.cc/J369-2BVC] [hereinafter FAM].
18
FAM, supra note 17, at 1743.
19
Id.; see also A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16.
20
Children are permitted to marry under limited circumstances in all fifty states. Research of
state marriage data indicates that at least 207,468 minors married in the United States between 2000 and 2015. Anjali Tsui et al., Child Marriage in America: By the Numbers, PBS
FRONTLINE (July 6, 2017), http://apps.frontline.org/child-marriage-by-the-numbers/ [http://
perma.cc/MH36-TD5S]. This number likely underreports the problem, as it includes data
from only forty-one states and that data includes gaps in years and counties reporting in
some states. Id. “Advocates in the United States differ with respect to whether child marriage
can be directly equated with forced marriage.” Swegman, supra note 16, at 3.
21
Julia Alanen, Custom or Crime? (Part I of IV): Catalysts and Consequences of Forced
Marriage, 29 AM. J. FAM. L. 227, 227 (2016); see also Shamita Das Dasgupta, Foreword to
VIDYA SRI & DARAKSHAN RAJA, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE: ADDRESSING FORCED
MARRIAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2013) (“arranged and forced marriages may be
viewed as points on a continuum of ‘persuasion’ that stretches between two extremes: mild
request and severe abuse.”).
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marriage victims are minors;22 a minor may not be psychologically prepared to
make major life decisions;23 the social norms and legal structures that place minors under parental control make them especially vulnerable to forced marriages promoted by their parents or guardians;24 and child brides face an increased
risk of abuse within marriage25 and health risks from early pregnancies.26 Finally, minors who are forced to marry often marry adults, which may increase
their vulnerability in the marriage,27 and make them legally unable to consent to
sex under statutory rape laws.28 On the other hand, concerns about preserving
the autonomy of older minors, and the recognition that minors may have legitimate reasons to marry before they reach eighteen years of age, have contributed to a robust debate within the United States as to whether and under what circumstances minors should be deemed capable to consent to marry.29 Although
concerns particular to minors often are raised in forced marriage literature, the
problem of forced marriage is not limited to children. The U.S. Department of

22

Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 1; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 2; Swegman, supra
note 16, at 3.
23
U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Joint General Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
on Harmful Practices, at 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Recommendation 31].
24
See generally 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN at v–vi (rev. 2d ed.
2005).
25
Judith McFarlane et al., Child Brides, Forced Marriage, and Partner Violence in America: Tip of an Iceberg Revealed, 127 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 706, 706 (2016);
Swegman, supra note 16, at 3.
26
Recommendation 31, supra note 23, at 7, 22.
27
Tsui et al., supra note 20 (86 percent of minors married between 2000–2015 married
adults).
28
See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
29
The United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, for example, considers all
child marriages to be forced because children under eighteen are incapable of giving a valid
consent to marriage. Cheryl Thomas, Forced and Early Marriage: A Focus on Central and
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries with Selected Laws from Other Countries, U.N. Doc. EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.08. Many international human rights instruments
and recommendations from human rights bodies promote eighteen as the appropriate minimum age to marry for boys and girls. See, e.g., Recommendation 21, supra note 12 (“the
Committee considers that the minimum age for marriage should be 18 years for both man
and woman. When men and women marry, they assume important responsibilities. Consequently, marriage should not be permitted before they have attained full maturity and capacity to act.”). On the other hand, organizations including the ACLU and the Women’s Law
Center of Maryland have argued that total bans on marriage before eighteen undermine the
autonomy of older minors and infringe upon the fundamental right to marry. Tsui et. al., supra note 4. Other groups have objected that marriage provides one of only a few viable paths
to emancipation and exit from the foster care system, and that minors may want their children to be born to married parents. Id.
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State has recognized that those most at risk of forced marriages fall between the
ages of thirteen and thirty.30
Free and full consent to marriage not only requires that an individual approves of the idea of marriage, its timing, and the intended partner; but also that
the individual can reject a proposed marriage without facing significant negative repercussions.31 Forced marriages include any marriage that one party is
unable to end or leave, even if the marriage was initially entered consensually.32
B. The Scope of the Problem
Forced marriages take many forms. They include civil marriages recognized under state and federal laws, marriages sanctified by religious or customary/traditional authorities, informal cohabitation recognized as a marriage by
the family and community, or some combination of the three.33 Forced marriages can involve U.S. citizens or immigrants, and take place both within the
United States and abroad, after a victim is tricked or coerced into traveling to
her family’s home country.34
National data on the prevalence of forced marriage is nonexistent in the
United States.35 The little information that does exist stems from surveys of
community-based service providers and localized surveys of individuals from
particular communities or settings.36 Although much remains unknown about
the issue, anecdotal findings in three distinct contexts suggest a broader problem.37
First, forced marriage is an identifiable issue facing clients of communitybased organizations throughout the United States. A voluntary survey of organizations in forty-seven states identified as many as 3,000 forced marriage cases
30

FAM, supra note 17.
Swegman, supra note 16, at 2.
32
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Preventing and Eliminating Child, Early and
Forced Marriage, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/22 (Apr. 2, 2014) (“A forced marriage is any
marriage which occurs without the full and free consent of one or both of the parties and/or
where one or both of the parties is/are unable to end or leave the marriage, including as a
result of duress or intense social or family pressure.”).
33
Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 4. Customary or traditional marriages are conducted according to the laws or beliefs of a cultural group that may or may not have a basis in religion.
Id. at Terminology.
34
FAM, supra note 17, at 1743.1–.3; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; McFarlane et al.,
supra note 25, at 708–09.
35
CYNTHIA HELBA ET AL., REPORT ON EXPLORATORY STUDY INTO HONOR VIOLENCE
MEASUREMENT METHODS 3-3 (2014); SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 8. There are many challenges to collecting valid quantitative data on forced marriage, including the many forms of
unregistered and informal marriages. Thus, many countries must rely on anecdotal data and
small-scale studies to understand the problem. See, e.g., RUDE-ANTOINE, supra note 10, at
22.
36
HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 7-3.
37
HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 3.
31
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over a two-year period.38 This number is particularly striking because the vast
majority of respondents reported that their agency neither screened for, nor offered assistance related to, forced marriage at the time.39 The survey identified
reports of forced marriage involving women originating from fifty-six different
countries and, although it focused on immigrant women, also produced reports
of forced marriage within non-immigrant American families.40
Second, women receiving services for domestic abuse report experience
with forced marriage in significant numbers. In a 2016 study of mothers subjected to intimate partner violence, 17 percent of the 277 participants reported
having been forced to marry or subjected to a forced marriage attempt.41 At the
time of these reported incidents, nearly half of the participants were under the
age of eighteen, most were U.S. citizens, and the vast majority were in the
United States.42 Most neither sought nor received assistance.43 When they did
reach out for help, most confided in friends or family members; few turned to
formal sources of support.44
Third, the pressure for girls to marry is pervasive within some communities. In one study, twenty-eight out of thirty young female clients of an organization serving West African immigrants had been pressured to marry or were
married before they reached eighteen years of age.45 In another study, students
of Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian descent at the City University of New York revealed frequent anxiety and family tension regarding marriage.46 Forced marriage practices also have been documented within several
non-immigrant conservative religious groups.47
38

Id. at 7. Of the more than 500 agencies that responded to the survey, 41 percent reported
at least one known or suspected case of forced marriage during 2009–2011. Id.
39
Id. at 5–6. Half of the survey respondents reported that forced marriages usually or always
occurred before the victim was connected to the agency. Id. at 7. Only 22 percent of respondents reported having screening processes that would enable them to identify forced
marriage concerns. Id. at 5. Less than 16 percent reported that their agency would be able to
assist individuals facing forced marriage if cases were identified. Id. at 6.
40
Id. at 7. The countries most frequently identified included India, Pakistan, Mexico, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Id. Respondents also identified
“over a dozen countries in Africa, numerous countries in Asia and the Middle East, and select countries in Europe and the Americas.” Id.
41
McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708. All of the study participants qualified for domestic violence shelter or a civil protection order. Id. at 707.
42
Id. at 708–09 (noting that 45 percent reported the forced marriage or attempt occurring
when they were under eighteen; 74 percent were U.S. citizens; 85 percent reported that the
forced marriage or attempt occurred in the United States).
43
Id. at 708.
44
Id. at 710.
45
Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9. Only six of the girls “outwardly resisted” early marriage
and two fully consented. Id.
46
See generally ANTHONY MARCUS ET AL., IS FORCED MARRIAGE A PROBLEM IN THE UNITED
STATES? 2, http://www.theahafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AHA_ForcedMarriage-Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/82GH-HQ49] (last visited May. 8, 2018). See also
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C. Causes
Forced marriage is driven by a number of factors.48 Three common motivators in the United States include pregnancy, honor, and tradition. Pregnancy
contributes to forced marriages because of social views that sex, pregnancy,
and childbirth should occur exclusively within marriage. As one example,
Keith Strawn drove his fourteen-year-old daughter from Idaho to Missouri to
take advantage of a Missouri law permitting younger minors to marry.49 In
Missouri, Strawn forced his daughter to marry her twenty-four-year-old rapist
because she was pregnant, and Strawn believed that men must marry the women they impregnate.50 Although his actions were extreme and horrifying,
Strawn’s worldview is no outlier in the United States. The continued recognition of the “shotgun wedding” within American popular culture points to longstanding beliefs and social pressures within some communities that a pregnancy
must result in a wedding.51 The prevalence of pregnancy exceptions to minimum marriage age laws reflect the view that sex and pregnancy should occur
within marriage, set up marriage as a solution to teen pregnancy, and convey
UK Statistics 2016, supra note 10, at 9 (identifying Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Somalia,
and Afghanistan as the countries related to the highest number of forced marriage reports;
Pakistan had the largest share by far with 43 percent of reports, followed by Bangladesh with
8 percent).
47
Esther’s Story, UNCHAINED AT LAST, http://www.unchainedatlast.org/about-arrangedforced-marriage/esthers-story/ [https://perma.cc/FZF9-8JK9] (last visited May. 8, 2018) (describing a forced marriage in a Hassidic community); Kristof, supra note 4 (including stories
about forced marriage in a Pentecostal church, a conservative Christian household, and an
ultra-Orthodox Jewish family).
48
HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9; Swegman, supra
note 16, at 1.
49
E. Idaho Father Arranged Marriage of his Daughter, 14, to Man Who Got Her Pregnant,
IDAHO ST. J. (May 31, 2016), http://idahostatejournal.com/members/e-idaho-father-arrangedmarriage-of-his-daughter-to-man/article_55a4c32f-605e-5081-a12e-561151a58887.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/5XJQ-KFPY].
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., DIXIE CHICKS, White Trash Wedding, on HOME (Open Wide/ Monument/ Columbia Records 2002) (“Baby’s on its way. Say I do and kiss me quick because baby’s on its
way”); KEVIN FOWLER, Knocked Up, on CHIPPIN’ AWAY (Average Joe’s 2011) (“Yeah, your
family’s got the shotgun ready . . . I can hear those church bells chime . . . No, I may not be
ready for a wedding, honey . . . But I know that I ain’t ready to die”); RELIENT K, Deathbed,
on FIVE SCORE AND SEVEN YEARS AGO (Capitol Records 2007) (“Got married on my twentyfirst. Eight months before my wife would give birth. It’s easier to be sure you love someone
. . . When her father inquires with the barrel of a gun”); see also NICHOLAS L. SYRETT,
AMERICAN CHILD BRIDE: A HISTORY OF MINORS AND MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 234–
36 (2016) (identifying pregnancy as a cause of the rise of teen marriages following World
War II, and noting that “[m]any girls, and especially those who dated young boys, were
‘forced’ into marriage on discovering that they were pregnant”). Men are often those forced
into “shotgun” marriages. Although no reliable statistics on the number of men forced into
marriages exist in the United States, data from the United Kingdom and France indicate that
men consistently seek assistance (although in considerably smaller numbers than women).
See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 10.
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state support for children being born into marriages.52 Teenage pregnancies in
particular may lead to forced marriages, because families retain more control
over the bride-to-be.53 Notably, the American South and Southwest have the
highest teen pregnancy rates in the country, and also the highest rates of teen
marriages.54
In some cases, marriages may be forced to halt criminal rape or statutory
rape investigations. At age eleven, Sherry Johnson was forced to marry a twenty-year-old man, one of two members of her church who had raped her, after
child welfare officials began investigating the circumstances of her pregnancy.55 Ms. Johnson’s mother and church leaders forced her to marry her attacker
to protect him from criminal prosecution.56
Two additional motivators for forced marriage, which often intertwine, are
adherence to tradition and preservation of family honor.57 In certain immigrant
and nonimmigrant communities in the United States, it is customary for women
to marry at a young age.58 Once young women reach puberty, families may take
steps to remove them from corrupting influences and preserve their reputations
in advance of marriage, such as withdrawing them from school or restricting
their contact with non-family members.59 Families may suddenly make or accelerate marriage plans if a daughter is believed to be socializing with boys, dating, engaging in sexual activity, or is viewed as becoming “too American-

52

SYRETT, supra note 51, at 260–61.
People v. Dozier, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (“The state has a legitimate concern that females sixteen years and younger do not become pregnant or suffer
physical injury, and as a result, find themselves facing practical problems for which their
youth has not prepared them. Forced marriage, unwed motherhood, adoption, abortion, the
need for medical treatment and precipitate withdrawal from school are just some of the considerations which often have to be faced. . . .”); In re Comm’r of Soc. Servs. ex rel Leslie C.,
614 N.Y.S.2d 855, 860 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (“[T]here are sound social policy reasons underlying the public policy of discouraging sexual intercourse among unwed females under
the age of seventeen. Certain consequences, such as . . . forced marriage . . . must invariably
be faced when children bear children.”).
54
SYRETT, supra note 51, at 264–65.
55
Kristof, supra note 4.
56
Id.
57
HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8.
58
See, e.g., Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9; Case Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case
Scenarios for Lisa Martin (July 12, 2017) (case examples from a Christian non-immigrant
religious community and a Pakistani immigrant community).
59
Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58 (“Sarah,” and “Halimah”); Yasmine Koenig as told to Liz Welch, My Mom Took Me Overseas
and Forced Me into Being a Teen Bride, SEVENTEEN (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.seventeen.c
om/life/real-girl-stories/a40668/parents-sent-me-to-the-middle-east-to-get-married/
[https://perma.cc/FAX8-CHBE] (describing how a mother removed daughter from school
after eighth grade and took her to Palestine to marry at fifteen after she was discovered to
have a boyfriend, and separately forced an older sister to marry after discovering a diary entry about kissing a boy).
53
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ized.”60 In some communities, a young woman’s disobedience to any direction
from the male head of the family, including a dictate to marry, is considered
dishonor to her family.61 To “restore” the family’s honor in the wake of disobedience, the woman may be severely punished, disowned, or even killed.62
Young women might submit to marriages they do not wish to enter, or remain
in marriages they otherwise would leave, out of fear that their decisions may
provoke retributory violence from family members against themselves or others.63 Other common motivators behind forced marriages include parents’ beliefs that a marriage serves a child’s best interests; obligations to honor contracts or arrangements between families; and the desire to secure economic or
immigration benefits to families or the intended spouse.64
D. Tactics
Individuals facing forced marriage often experience coordinated pressure
from parents, relatives, friends, and community members.65 Common tactics
include: parents threatening to harm or kill themselves; declaring the ruin of a
family’s or individual’s reputation; isolation;66 social ostracization;67 threats to
kick an individual out of the house or withdraw financial support;68 taking or
threatening to take a child out of school;69 or threats of physical violence
against the individual or others they care about.70 In more extreme cases, tactics
have included physical violence or torture,71 threats of deportation, taking the
individual abroad through deception, kidnapping, captivity, stalking, consecrat60

HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8.
HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 1-2–1-3.
62
Id. at 1-4, 2-5–2-6, 3-2–3-3.
63
See Court Upholds Man’s Sentencing in ‘Honor Killing,’ CBS ATL. (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:05
AM), http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2013/01/22/court-upholds-mans-sentence-in-honor-killing/
[https://perma.cc/ 3UWD-76TN] [hereinafter CBS ATL., Honor Killing]; Dad Charged with
Murdering Reluctant Bride, CNN (July 9, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/08/
honor.killing/#cnnSTCText [https://perma.cc/WH5A-NZSW] [hereinafter CNN, Reluctant
Bride]; see also Mosi Secret, Court Documents Detail a Deadly Family Feud from Brooklyn
to Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at A26 (describing how an American citizen was
forced into a marriage in Pakistan, then threatened with murder when she escaped, and those
who helped her escape were killed).
64
HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8.
65
Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9.
66
McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09; Debjani Roy, An Introduction to Forced Marriage in the South Asian Community in the United States, MANAVI OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 9,
at 22 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20160810073656/http://www.manavi.org/docu
ments/Manavi_paper9_pass-6.26.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY22-YR44].
67
McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09.
68
Id.
69
Roy, supra note 66, at 23.
70
HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09.
71
Roy, supra note 66, at 23; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09.
61
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ing a marriage without the individual’s knowledge or participation, withholding
food or medical care, and even threats of murder.72
Potential forced marriage victims may know or suspect that a marriage is
being planned, or they may be taken completely by surprise. Thirteen-year-old
Jesse Bender fled her home in California with the support of an uncle because
she feared she would be forced into a marriage during an impending family trip
to Pakistan.73 Kay Gans’s parents told her they were taking her and her boyfriend to a football game when they drove them to West Virginia from Ohio.74
Instead, they took Kay and her boyfriend to a county clerk’s office, directed
Kay to tell the clerk she was seventeen years old, consented to her marriage to
her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, and saw the couple married before driving
them back to Ohio.75
E. Consequences
Those facing forced marriage experience numerous harms. In contemporary U.S. society, where divorce is a commonplace and relatively accessible
remedy, the harm created by the solemnization of a marriage may be difficult to
understand. But forced marriages cause real and significant harm to those subjected to them, whatever the tactics involved. “Forced marriage is [a] form of
violence against women in its own right, even when sexual violence and other
forms of harm and abuse are not present.”76 Forced marriage deprives a nonconsenting spouse of dignity, autonomy, and self-determination.77 Denying an
individual the opportunity to choose her own life partner, and thereby the direction and circumstances of her life, communicates that her own needs or desires
are unworthy of respect and secondary to the designs for her life that others
have created to advance their own interests. Those forced into marriage also
face rape,78 domestic and family violence,79 stalking,80 and, in some cultures,
72

HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8. A man in Georgia was convicted of murdering his
daughter after she threatened to divorce the husband that she had been forced to marry
against her will. The news reports described the marriage as “arranged,” but statements to
the police by the victim’s father’s wife indicate that the marriage occurred without the victim’s consent. CNN, Reluctant Bride, supra note 63; CBS ATL., Honor Killing, supra note
63; see also Secret, supra note 63 (describing how an American citizen was forced into a
marriage in Pakistan, then threatened with murder when she escaped, and those who helped
her escape were killed).
73
Paloma Esquivel, Girl, 13, Says She Fled Home to Avoid a Forced Marriage in Pakistan,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/04/local/la-me-hesperia-girl20110304 [https://perma.cc/T7SA-XEPL].
74
State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 709 (Ohio 1958).
75
Id. at 714.
76
Swegman, supra note 16, at 2; see also Recommendation 31, supra note 23.
77
See Recommendation 21, supra note 12 (“A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter
freely into marriage is central to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being.”).
78
SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 14, 21; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09.
79
MARCUS ET AL., supra note 46, at 2; SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 24.
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female genital cutting (FGC),81 both before and after a marriage occurs,82 all of
which may lead to depression, suicide, or suicide attempts.83 Moreover, those
forced into marriages who are cut off from friends and restricted in their
movements may suffer isolation and lose opportunities for education and employment.84
Multiple barriers prevent individuals from escaping forced marriages.
Those forced into marriages may face reprisals from family members if they
resist, abandon, or seek to dissolve their unions.85 Individuals who are taken
abroad to marry may be left without a passport, means of communication, or
access to finances.86 For example, Yasmine Koenig was only fifteen when her
parents forced her to marry a twenty-four-year-old man during a family trip to
Palestine. Yasmine’s parents did not tell her that they planned for her to marry
before they left the United States; they told her that they were going to visit her
sisters and other relatives.87 Yasmine escaped her marriage only because she
had access to a cell phone. She contacted the U.S. Embassy, which arranged
her transportation back to the United States after two months of furtive communications.88
F. Legal Responses
The problems of child and forced marriage in the United States recently
have garnered increasing attention from state legislatures. Between 2016 and
the time of this article’s publication, at least eighteen states have considered
bills that would reform civil marriage laws to reduce forced and child marriage
by increasing the lawful marriage age, requiring judicial approval for marriages
involving minors, or emancipating minors who are granted permission to marry
to ensure they have the capacity to protect their own legal interests.89 At the
80

Swegman, supra note 16, at 8.
Id. at 9–10.
82
Id. at 6.
83
SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 15; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 9.
84
THE BRITISH ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS, A CHOICE BY RIGHT: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON FORCED MARRIAGE 15 (2000) [hereinafter A CHOICE BY RIGHT].
85
HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 3-3; SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 20; Swegman, supra
note 16, at 8.
86
ELEANOR STOBART, FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT, MULTI-AGENCY PRACTICE GUIDELINES:
HANDLING CASES OF FORCED MARRIAGE 14 (2009).
87
Welch, supra note 59.
88
Id. Upon her return to the United States, Yasmine was placed into the foster care system.
She ultimately was adopted by her foster family. Id.
89
S.B. 133, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2018); H.B. 2006, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2018); H.B. 71, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 140, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 208, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 48, 2018 Gen.
Asemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); H.B. 191, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B.
670, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B. 1785, 110th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2018); H.B. 2521, 110th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018); H.B. 790,
81
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time of publication, at least four states have succeeded—Connecticut, New
York, Texas, and Virginia adopted marriage reforms in 2016 and 2017.90 Delaware reformed its marriage law to require all minors to seek court approval to
marry in 2007.91
Separate from the recent push for marriage reform, nine states, the District
of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands criminalize forced marriage.92 Al0though the operative statutes remain good law, they appear to have little practical utility. Several of the offenses are drafted in antiquated terms and are included within statutes enacted to combat other problems, such as abduction, defilement, prostitution, and pandering.93 A few newer statutes address forced
marriage in the context of human trafficking.94 Despite the fact that some of

2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); S.B. 273, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017);
H.B. 5442, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 799, 437th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); S.B. 861, 437th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); H.B. 2310,
190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 2311, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2017); S.B. 785, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 786, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 270, 99th Gen Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017); H.B. 499,
165th Gen. Ct., 1st year Reg Sess. (N.H. 2017); Assemb. B. 5524, 240th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 4407, 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 35 (2017); S.B. 198, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); H.B. 1038, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); H.B.
3932, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 1705, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); Assemb. B. 3091, 217th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2016); S.B. 2528, 217th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess.
(N.J. 2016); S.B. 415, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016).
90
H.B. 5442, 2017 Gen Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); Assemb. B. 5524, 240th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 4407, 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 35 (2017); H.B. 3932, 85th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 1705, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 415, 2016
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016).
91
The law eliminated a prior exception, which permitted pregnant minors to marry without
court approval. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (2017). A parent, guardian, or next friend
must petition the court for approval of the marriage on behalf of the minor to be married. Id.
For more information on the laws regarding marriage age in all fifty states, see Understanding State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Exceptions, supra note 6.
92
CAL. PENAL CODE § 265 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 22-2705 (2018); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.265 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-31 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1117–19 (2017); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-355 (2017); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1301 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 61-214 (2017); TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., CRIMINAL LAWS ADDRESSING FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2013) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAWS]; Landau, supra note 11, at 47–49 (including California, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Virginia,
and West Virginia).
93
Landau, supra note 11, at 47–49.
94
CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 92; Landau, supra note 11, at 47. The United Nations International Labor Organization and International Organization for Migration recently copublished a study recognizing forced marriage as one form of human trafficking/modern
slavery. See INT’L LABOUR ORG. (ILO) ET AL., GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY:
FORCED LABOUR AND FORCED MARRIAGE 9 (2017).
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these statutes have existed for a century or more, researchers have been unable
to identify a single prosecution for forced marriage under any of these laws.95
G. Gaps in Legal Relief
Existing marriage, criminal, child abuse and neglect, and tort laws have at
least a theoretical potential to provide legal protection from forced marriage. In
practice, none of these remedies is likely to provide material relief on a wide
scale. For example, civil marriage laws can attempt to deter the forced marriage
of minors by categorically limiting minors’ access to state-sanctioned marriage
and increase state scrutiny of marriages involving minors through judicial review. Although such laws may succeed in delaying or deterring the marriages
of some minors, civil marriage laws do not prevent marriages from being conducted without state sanction. Marriages conducted abroad, and marriages conducted within the United States in religious or customary ceremonies are not
subject to state regulation. State marriage law kicks in only once the couple
seeks legal recognition by or a marriage-based benefit from the state.
The criminal justice system is also unlikely to be able to respond effectively to the problem on a wide scale for two primary reasons. First, individuals
facing forced marriages are unlikely to cooperate. Those facing forced marriages often report wanting to postpone or avoid marriage without severing ties to
their families, communities, and culture.96 To prevent negative repercussions
for family members, those facing forced marriages have declined outside assistance if they believe it could result in prosecution, deportation, embarrassment,
or separation from family members.97
Second, even where victims want to cooperate, law enforcement officers’
reluctance to interfere in private family life or take a position on a “cultural”
matter98 may preclude the investigation and prosecution of forced marriage

95

CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 92; VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 5. At least
one state, Michigan, repealed a prior forced marriage criminal statute (former MICH. COMP.
LAWS. § 750.11 (repealed 2010)) as part of an effort to repeal outdated criminal statutes that
were not being enforced. Id.
96
Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 2; STOBART, supra note 86, at 13.
97
A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16, at 2.1, 2.8 (reporting that in nearly all of the 250
cases per year addressed by the Home Office Forced Marriage Unit and in all of the 165
forced marriage cases reported to the Metropolitan police in the two years preceding the report, the potential victim sought assurances that no prosecution would result before accepting assistance). VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8; Bangura et al., supra note
3, at 12.
98
VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8. In the related context of female genital
cutting, another form of violence perpetrated against young women and girls by family
members, more than twenty years passed between the enactment of the federal law criminalizing the practice in 1996 and the first prosecution to enforce it. These first charges for female genital cutting were filed in April 2017 against a doctor, not parents or family members
of the victim. Arlene Tchekmedyian, For the First Time in the U.S., a Doctor Is Charged
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crimes.99 These factors limit the viability of prosecution as a remedy after a
forced marriage or an attempt to force a marriage has occurred, and the absence
of forced marriage prosecutions prevents the criminal justice system from deterring the practice.100
Some may consider the child abuse and neglect system a preferable means
of intervention for minors being forced into marriages by their parents. The
system has been effective in preventing forced marriages in cases brought to its
attention by experienced advocates.101 But, the abuse and neglect system may
not be well-equipped to address the problem as a matter of course. In practice,
child protection agencies may be unprepared to respond to forced marriage
complaints, and may view the circumstances of a child’s marriage as a “cultural
dispute” rather than a case of abuse or neglect requiring state intervention.102
In some states, child protection orders provide a mechanism for individuals
(rather than the state child welfare agency) to seek injunctive relief to protect a
child.103 Petitions for child protection orders typically must be filed by designated adults on behalf of a child, and must allege that qualifying criminal conduct has occurred.104 Child protection orders typically offer a more limited
range of remedies than those available through civil protection orders.

with Female Genital Mutilation. Here’s How the Law Came to Be, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 18,
2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-female-genital-mutilation-detroit-2017-sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/TTM7-33ZQ].
99
These challenges also have undermined criminal prosecution as an effective response to
forced marriage in United Kingdom. Since the United Kingdom criminalized forced marriage in 2014, only one case reportedly has been prosecuted. The case is an outlier in many
ways, including that it was brought against the intended spouse (not parents or relatives) of
the victim, and the alleged conduct involved allegations of numerous acts of physical and
sexual violence. Businessman Is First Person Jailed Under Forced Marriage Laws,
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015, 10:17AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/
jun/10/34-year-old-man-first-person-to-be-convicted-under-forced-marriage-laws [https://per
ma.cc/WGA7-ULU8].
100
See GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY, supra note 94, at 49.
101
In Virginia, for example, remedies ordered through a child in need of supervision proceeding, including a child protection order and the appointment of a guardian ad litem enabled a minor to remain in her family home while also being protected from a forced marriage. Interview with Jeanne Smoot, Senior Policy Attorney, Tahirih Just. Ctr. (July 2017).
102
Id.
103
ALA. CODE § 12-15-138 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234 (2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-114 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (2017); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-25
(2018); IND. CODE § 31-34-2.3-1 (2017); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 618 (2018); ME. STAT.
tit. 22, § 4035 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.505 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-427
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.400 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:19 (2017); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.55 (West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 1056 (McKinney 2018); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 60.19 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-107 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-152 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-202 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 48.45 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-430 (2017).
104
See infra Section II.C.2.
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A separate, shared potential drawback of criminal, abuse and neglect, and
child protection order proceedings for those facing forced marriages is the lack
of control such individuals have over these processes. Criminal and child abuse
proceedings are initiated and directed by the state, and child protection order
proceedings are initiated and directed by the state or a designated adult on behalf of a minor child. Exercising control over how a case is presented and the
remedies sought may be critical to the willingness of adults and older minors to
seek legal relief.105 Such autonomy may be especially important to individuals
who want to remain closely connected to their families or protect family members from embarrassment or other potentially negative repercussions from the
case.
Tort law may be pointed to as a potential avenue for legal relief that provides an opportunity for an individual facing a forced marriage to exercise control over the legal proceeding.106 Although tort may provide a promising source
of compensation for individuals harmed by forced marriage, and can also provide a path to an injunction—a civil court order that compels a defendant to respect a victim’s rights by directing the defendant to take or avoid specific action.107 Nevertheless, several procedural hurdles undermine the viability of tort
claims as a preventive tool.108 First, minor children are prohibited from bring105

Recognizing that the need to involve an adult might deter minors from seeking assistance, many states have granted teenagers the authority to make autonomous decisions about
issues relating to their health, well-being, and safety. Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love
Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 503–05
(2012) (matters over which states have granted minors decision-making power include
treatment for emergency medical care, substance abuse, sexually transmitted illnesses, mental health services, reproductive health services). Several states have likewise authorized minors to seek civil protection orders to protect themselves from dating and domestic violence
without adult involvement. See infra Section II.C.3.b.
106
Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543,
564–65 (1992) (noting that tort claims enable an individual to exercise control over the proceeding). Tort claims compensate individuals for wrongs done to them by other persons.
Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
107
Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 54–
55 (2007).
108
A plaintiff can request the court to enter an injunction under its powers of equity as part
of its exercise of jurisdiction over a tort claim. When evaluating a claim for an equitable injunction in a tort case, courts must consider:
(1) the nature of the interest to be protected, (2) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of the injunction and other remedies, (3) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, (4) any
related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (5) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if injunction is granted and to plaintiff if denied, (6) the interests of third persons and the
public, (7) the practicality of framing and enforcing the judgment.

Jeffrey R. Baker, The Failure and Promise of Common Law Equity in Domestic Abuse Cases, 58 LOY. L. REV. 559, 579–80 (2012) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936
(2011)). To support the issuance of a temporary injunction during the pendency of the case,
the plaintiff further must establish “(1) the extent of the threat of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the interlocutory injunction is not granted, (2) the consequences that the interlocu-
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ing tort cases against their parents in many states.109 Second, tort claims compensate retroactively; they may be brought only after harm/damages have been
caused.110 This means that, even when a parent or another person attempting to
force a marriage would be a permissible party in a tort case, a tort remedy for
forced marriage only would be available after that individual takes action that
actually causes harm to the plaintiff. Tort remedies would not be available to
prevent a forced marriage or a related harm from occurring. Third, tort actions
have a lengthy timeline for the issuance of relief, and do not provide a means to
access immediate intervention.111 Fourth, those facing forced marriages may
lack access to funds to cover the filing fees and costs that typically attend civil
actions.112 Fifth, the process of seeking injunctive and compensatory relief
through a tort action is complex and challenging to navigate without the assistance of counsel.113 Finally, equitable injunctions issued within tort cases lack a
ready enforcement mechanism. Violations are actionable as civil contempt,

tory relief may have on the defendant, (3) the probability that the plaintiff will succeed on
the merits, and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 580.
109
The doctrine of parental immunity protects parents against tort claims arising out of conduct during a child’s minority that is “inherent to the parent-child relationship.” Elizabeth G.
Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533, 545 (2013).
As of 2013, more than half of states continued to recognize this doctrine. Id. The doctrine is
intended to protect the privacy and harmony of the family. Id. at 539–53. These principles
were likewise cited to justify the development of the doctrine of spousal immunity, which
persisted well into the twentieth century, and was abrogated in light of the growing recognition that the sanctification of privacy facilitated male domination and abuse of women. Id. at
549; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2161–70 (1996).
110
Baker, supra note 108, at 591.
111
Id. at 588–89 (“If the need for relief is immediate, urgent, and not monetarily quantifiable, tort actions are inadequate legal remedies; tort liability does not answer the victim’s
needs.”); Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1063 (2014). By the time many individuals facing
forced marriages reach out for help, they need immediate intervention and support.
Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58. Emergency relief may be particularly important to prevent an individual from being taken abroad to
marry because once an individual leaves the U.S., it becomes extraordinarily difficult for the
government to intervene. Individuals taken abroad may have their passports taken from
them, and may be physically isolated and cut off from outside communication. Consular officials may face significant challenges even locating and communicating with such persons,
let alone assisting them to return to the United States. Individuals seeking to stave off international travel or an impending ceremony may need same-day court intervention and temporary ex parte relief. STOBART, supra note 86, at 14.
112
Stoever, supra note 111, at 1063.
113
Cf. Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 161–63 (2003) (describing the time and procedural complexities inherent
in seeking a civil injunction through a divorce claim, the most common mechanism for victims of domestic abuse to secure injunctive relief before the creation of the civil protection
order remedy).
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which may amount to a “verbal ‘slap on the hand,’ ” or alternatively, could result in fines and even periods of jail time as a means to coerce compliance.114
Together, these gaps and the limited insight we have into the wishes of individuals facing forced marriage suggest that ready access to a low-barrier,
emergency civil injunctive remedy could meaningfully benefit this group.
II. THE VIABILITY OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS TO PREVENT FORCED
MARRIAGE
A. The History and Goals of Civil Protection Orders
In the domestic violence context, similar challenges in securing effective,
accessible legal relief led to the establishment of the civil protection order remedy in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.115 A product of the battered
women’s movement of the 1960s and 70s, civil protection orders were created
to prevent future abuse and enhance the autonomy of those subjected to domestic violence.116 Over time, many states have expanded the context in which individuals can seek civil protection orders from domestic violence between
spouses, family, and household members, to dating violence, stalking, and sexual assault. Some states have integrated these additional bases for relief into
their original domestic violence civil protection order statutes, whereas others
have created separate protection orders for these expanded contexts.117
Protection orders were revolutionary in enabling individuals subjected to
domestic violence to reliably and expediently access the courts and secure enforceable legal relief tailored to their needs outside of divorce proceedings and
criminal prosecutions.118 This enabled those subjected to abuse to seek legal
protection without having to end their marriages or cooperate in seeking criminal penalties for those abusing them.119 Conversely, as law enforcement in the
114

Id.; David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases,
4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 239, 243–44 (1990) (explaining that courts have inherent authority to
hold parties in contempt for failure to comply with court orders). Punishments issued under a
court’s civil contempt power are remedial—for the benefit of the party that the order protects. Id. at 247–48.
115
Every state and the District of Columbia enacted a protection order statute between 1970
and 1993. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993).
116
Barbara J. Hart, Civil Protection Orders, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 5, 23 (1992); Klein &
Orloff, supra note 115, at 810.
117
Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018), with FLA. STAT. §§ 741.28 (domestic violence
injunction), 784.0485 (2017) (stalking injunction), 784.046 (2017) (dating and sexual violence injunction) (2017).
118
LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVORCENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 79 (2008); Hart, supra
note 116, at 23; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1040–43; Tarr, supra note 113, at 161–63.
119
Divorce was not a sure path to relief even for those who wanted to pursue it, and receiving injunctive relief as part of a divorce judgment was also not guaranteed. LEIGH
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1970s and 80s rarely arrested or prosecuted perpetrators of domestic violence
even in cases where prosecution was strongly desired, the advent of protection
orders created a viable path to legal intervention.120 A number of features have
made protection orders a comparatively accessible civil remedy, including: the
availability of same-day emergency ex parte relief, expedited proceedings, the
elimination of fees for filing and service of process, the creation of simplified
court forms, and the common availability of courthouse-based advocates to assist with the filing process.121 Where advocates are present, protection order
proceedings also may serve as a gateway connecting those subjected to abuse to
additional community social services resources.122 To enhance their deterrent
effect, states imbued protection orders with stronger enforcement mechanisms
than those associated with other civil injunctions, with many states making violation of a protection order a criminal offense as well as cause for criminal or
civil contempt.123 To this end, civil protection orders offer an additional avenue

GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9
(2012); Tarr, supra note 113, at 163. But cf. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 5 (noting that system actors frequently encourage or coerce those subjected to domestic violence to
leave their relationships, and this pressure deters women from seeking help from social services providers and the criminal justice system). Tort claims against abusive partners were
often not available against spouses at this time because of the continued existence of the doctrine of spousal immunity, which has since been abrogated. See Baker, supra note 108, at
602–03. For a number of reasons, many who are subjected to abuse do not want their partners to go to jail and may find the relief offered by protection orders more beneficial to them
or their children than prosecution. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders
for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1508 (2008).
120
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 71–73; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 9.
121
Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1506; Tarr, supra note 113, at 163–65. Several common features of protection orders across states, including the elimination of filing fees and provision
of cost-free assistance with service of process, have resulted from conditions upon federal
funding instituted through the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and its subsequent reauthorizations. See, e.g., Costs for Criminal Charges and Protection Orders, 34 U.S.C.
§ 10450 (2012); Sarah Henry & Monica N. Player, VAWA Prohibition on Fees for Service of
Protection Orders: Implications for Law Enforcement Agencies, NAT’L CTR. ON PROT.
ORDERS AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT (2013), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/va
wa_prohibition_on_fees_for_service_of_protection_orders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2NXZ3SK4]. Accessing the remedy still poses challenges to self-represented parties as court forms
can be complex, a contested evidentiary hearing may be required to secure relief. Goldfarb,
supra note 119, at 1515–16 (the process of obtaining an order can be “difficult, confusing,
and time-consuming,” as well as “upsetting, intimidating, or embarrassing” for petitioners,
and is more likely to be successful if petitioners have counsel or are supported by advocates
and other system actors); Tarr, supra note 113, at 163–65.
122
Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1509.
123
Id. at 1516–17; Hart, supra note 116, at 20–21.
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into the criminal justice system for those who want to hold their abusers criminally accountable for continued abuse.124
Civil protection orders are not a panacea, and may have unexpected negative consequences. For example, mandatory arrest and “no drop” policies may
result in criminal prosecution of respondents for protection order violations
against petitioners’ wishes,125 and court findings of protection order violations
can result in deportation for non-citizen respondents.126 Moreover, petitioners
who obtain protection orders may face discrimination in housing, insurance,
and employment.127 Despite these potential drawbacks, protection orders have
become the most widely used civil or criminal remedy to combat domestic violence in the United States and petitioners who obtain orders express a consistently high level of satisfaction with the remedy.128 Protection orders have
proved effective at eliminating or decreasing violence and increasing petitioners’ feelings of safety and autonomy.129
B. The Potential for Civil Protection Orders to Prevent Forced Marriage
Forced marriage is a different problem from domestic violence, and requires its own nuanced solutions. Yet, the problems share characteristics that
suggest that civil protection orders may be an effective tool to prevent forced
marriage. First, the comparative control exercised by petitioners in civil protection order proceedings over whether and how to pursue a case, the remedies
sought, and whether and how to enforce court orders may encourage those facing forced marriages to seek relief.130 Second, those facing forced marriage may
124

Stoever, supra note 111, at 1043. But see GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80
(noting that problems remain with police willingness to take action in response to complaints
of protection order violations).
125
Tarr, supra note 113, at 191–92.
126
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012); Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary:
VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV.
163, 180–81 (1999); GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 77. See generally Hannah R.
Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S. Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27, 27 (2002).
127
See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 130–31.
128
Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1510; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1020–21.
129
Stoever, supra note 111, at 1021, 1064–66. But cf. Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1511–14,
1516 (noting that studies of compliance with protection orders have been somewhat mixed,
with compliance seeming to turn, in part, on the petitioner’s feelings about ending the relationship, characteristics of the respondent, and the history of abuse within the relationship, as
well as with a weak criminal justice system response to violations).
130
This control over how a case is presented to the court, of course, does not equate to full
control over the case result. For example, courts have denied petitioners’ requests to vacate
protection orders, keeping the orders in place over petitioners’ objections and fined or imprisoned petitioners who initiate contact with respondents while an order is in place.
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 81. See generally Kuennen, supra note 107, at 54–
55.
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need emergency intervention and expedited proceedings to bring some peace
and stability into households and ongoing relationships. Third, those facing
forced marriages who are financially dependent upon those they seek to restrain
may be unable to retain counsel or afford filing fees and costs of litigation.131
Finally, given the stakes involved, and the possibility that perpetrators may feel
entitled by cultural notions of honor or familial role to persist with their behavior, a civil remedy to prevent forced marriage may benefit from a strong, multifaceted enforcement regime.132
C. The Fit of Civil Protection Orders to the Problem of Forced Marriage
Although eligibility to seek a protection order varies by state, protection
order statutes throughout the United States share a number of common features.133 To qualify for relief, a petitioner typically must share a particular relationship to the perpetrator and have been subjected to, or threatened with, particular conduct.134 The two prongs of this analysis merge in the many states
permitting the issuance of protection orders on the basis of sexual assault and
stalking regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.135 Notably, a minor’s ability to access protection orders varies widely across states.136 Each of these features of the protection order remedy potentially limit its viability in the forced
marriage context.
Potential petitioners seeking protection orders relating to forced marriage
can be loosely grouped in three categories: (1) those seeking to prevent an impending marriage before it occurs, (2) those who were forced into a marriage
against their consent and now seek protection and/or to escape, and (3) those
who married consensually, but now feel forced to remain married and seek to
escape.137 Protection orders are available to varying extents to individuals in
each of these groups. Civil protection orders are most likely to provide a viable
remedy to prevent a forced marriage where a petitioner is an adult, is seeking to
restrain a parent, relative, or household member, and has been subjected to or
threatened with physical violence. After a forced marriage occurs, as well as
when a person feels forced to remain in a marriage s/he entered consensually,
protection orders are most viable if the petitioner seeks to restrain her spouse or
seeks to protect herself from acts or threats of violence by parents or relatives.

131
132
133
134
135
136
137

See supra INTRODUCTION.
See supra INTRODUCTION.
Stoever, supra note 111, at 1043.
See generally Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 814–42, 848.
See infra Section II.C.2.c.ii.
See generally Martin, supra note 105, at 503.
See generally supra Section I.B.
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1. Qualifying Relationships
To establish standing to seek a protection order, a petitioner typically must
first establish that she shares a qualifying relationship with the respondent.138
Protection order laws in many states have evolved from applying only to
spouses and household members, to offering protection within other intimate
relationships, and against perpetrators of rape and stalking, regardless of the
relationship between the parties.139 Under the relationship requirement, whether
a petitioner can seek a protection order to prevent a forced marriage turns on
the identity of those attempting to coerce her. As the factual context of forced
marriages differ from case to case, petitioners in forced marriage cases may
need to pursue relief against a variety of actors.
a. Parents
In many forced marriage cases, parents play a central role in coercing the
union.140 Most states permit the entry of domestic violence protection orders
between children and parents.141 Some of these expressly provide protection
between parents and children, whereas others protect blood relatives and/or
current and former household members—groups that often include parents and
children.142 Some states limit the remedy to children and parents who share or
have shared a residence, whereas others prohibit minor children from obtaining
protection orders against parents with whom they reside.143 A handful of states
do not allow minor children to pursue domestic violence protection orders
against parents.144 In these states, minor children must seek relief from their
138

Professor Deborah Epstein first introduced me to the terms “qualifying relationship” and
“qualifying conduct” to describe the common elements a petitioner must prove to justify the
entry of a civil protection order. Deborah Epstein et al., Domestic Relations: Domestic Violence, in DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRACTICE MANUAL (2016).
139
Hart, supra note 116, at 5; Martin, supra note 105, at 493; Stoever, supra note 111, at
1043–45.
140
Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58.
141
See infra APPENDIX 1.
142
See infra APPENDIX 1.
143
Compare ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017), FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017), IOWA CODE § 236.2
(2017), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017), MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017), and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1103 (2017), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017). The
District of Columbia explicitly precludes custodial parents from seeking protection orders
against minor children. Instead, these parents must seek court assistance through the Persons
In Need of Supervision (PINS) program in the juvenile court. D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(6)
(2018).
144
IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(27)(b) (2018); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017) (prohibits minor children from seeking relief against parents
with whom they reside); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 107.705 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102 (West 2017) (if petitioner is a minor);
WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa
1998) (holding that Iowa’s protection order statute grants minors standing only to seek pro-
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parents through the child abuse and neglect system, or by seeking a child protection order.145
b. Family and Household Members
Those facing forced marriages might also experience coercion from other
relatives, family friends, or community members. Most states permit the entry
of domestic violence protection orders against additional relatives by blood or
marriage.146 A few states require that such relatives share a household to qualify for relief.147 The majority of states also permit the entry of protection orders
against any household members, regardless of the nature of their relationships
to the petitioner.148 Several states limit eligible household members to those
who share an intimate or familial relationship with the petitioner.149
tection against spouses and individuals with whom they are cohabiting and precludes standing to seek protection against parents and other household members); M.A. v. E.A., 909
A.2d 1168, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (precluding a mother from bringing a
claim on behalf of her minor daughter against the child’s stepfather because the statute permitted only persons over eighteen or emancipated minors to bring claims against household
members); Strother v. Strother, 34 P.3d 736, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (overturning a protection order sought by a mother on behalf of her minor child against the child’s father because
the statute did not offer protection to minors against parents); see also APPENDIX 4.
145
STATE OF N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH FAMILY DIV. & DIST. COURT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROTOCOLS 5 (2013). In Wyoming, child protection orders are available only as part of the
final disposition of a child abuse and neglect case. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-430 (2017); see
also supra Section I.G.
146
See infra APPENDIX 1. Some states permit a broad range of relatives to seek relief, whereas others designate only certain relationships, such as siblings, or grandparents/grandchildren. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017) (related up to the fourth degree of consanguinity), D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018) (relatives by blood, adoption, legal
custody, marriage, or domestic partnership), and 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017) (persons related by blood or marriage), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901(12), 1041(2) (2017)
(grandparents, grandchildren, siblings), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2018) (grandparents
and grandchildren), and VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017) (siblings, grandparents and
grandchildren).
147
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017) (relative of an individual who qualifies as a current
or former “household member” if the relative also lived with the defendant); FLA. STAT.
§ 741.28 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017) (reside together or resided together within one
year of the assault); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (2017); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017) (parents-in-law,
children-in-law, or siblings-in-law covered only if cohabit).
148
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 2018); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a(2) (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1001
(2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-1 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); IOWA
CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720
(West 2018) (unrestricted only if the victim is a child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1
(2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903
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Intended Spouse

In some cases, an intended spouse may play a role in attempting to force a
marriage.150 Whether a potential victim of forced marriage could seek protection against an intended spouse turns on the nature of their relationship at the
time the case is filed. Although all states offer protection order relief against
spouses,151 and a solid majority extend relief against dating partners,152 only a
minority of states offer explicit protection for engagement relationships. 153 This
distinction is important in the forced marriage context. To find that parties have
a qualifying dating relationship, courts may have to consider factors such as the
length of the relationship;154 the frequency of the parties’ interaction;155 the par-

(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-01 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 60.1 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (2017); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-7-102 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101 (2017), 1103 (2017); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27204 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2017).
149
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017) (stating that a person must have had an intimate relationship
with the defendant or be a relative of someone who did); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041
(2017) (stating that cohabitants must hold themselves out as a couple); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-1 (2017) (excludes those cohabiting “only by virtue of an economic or contractual affiliation.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018) (member of an unmarried couple
unless the victim is a child, then no restriction as to relationship); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132
(2017) (“sexual or intimate relationship”); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002 (2017) (“related by
consanguinity or affinity”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (2017) (includes “other past or
present family members of a household.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2018) (“persons living as spouses”).
150
McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708.
151
See infra APPENDIX 1; see also Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 814–15.
152
See infra APPENDIX 1.
153
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(3)b. (2017) (“A dating relationship includes the period of engagement to be married.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017). Protection orders could also be available against fiancés in North Dakota, which permits a protection order to be issued if the parties are deemed by the court to have a “sufficient relationship.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2017); Id. § 14-07.1.02 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit., 22, § 60.1
(2017); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017) (note that R.I. extends protection to engagement
or dating relationships only where one party is a minor).
154
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103
(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. § 10-1041 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE
§ 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West
2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); MINN.
STAT. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19
(West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3.1 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017).
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ties’ expectations about the romantic, affectionate, or sexual nature of the relationship;156 whether the parties have affirmed their relationship to others;157 and
attendance at social outings as a couple.158 Ordinary fraternization and casual
social relationships do not give rise to grounds for relief.159
Statutes that extend protection within dating relationships could appear sufficient to extend protection to fiancées as well, since romantic love and courtship commonly precedes marriage in the United States.160 In the case of a
forced marriage, however, protecting only dating partners and spouses leaves a
gap, since the petitioner may have no relationship with an intended spouse, let
alone an intimate one. In such circumstances, a potential forced marriage victim may have no relationship-based ground to seek protection against an intended spouse and may need to rely instead on conduct-based grounds for relief.
d. Crime-Based Relationships
A number of states also have established crime-based relationship grounds
for protection orders. These provisions permit protection orders to be entered
against any individual who subjects a petitioner to particular crimes.

155

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103
(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
209A, § 1 (2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-10-3.1 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B7-402 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010
(2017).
156
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
209A, § 1 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); Id. § 107.726 (West 2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017).
157
See, e.g., S.K. v. J.H., 43 A.3d 1248, 1250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
158
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.010 (West 2018).
159
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2015);
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214
(2018); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (201); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812
(McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204 (2017).
160
D’vera Cohn, Love and Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2013) (summarizing results
of a Pew poll showing that Americans view love as a primary reason to marry).
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Stalking

Many states would permit a potential victim of forced marriage to seek a
protection order against any perpetrator of stalking, regardless of her relationship to the perpetrator.161 Some of these states have granted victims of stalking
or harassment access to domestic violence protection orders,162 whereas others
created a separate stalking or harassment protection order remedy for this
group.163 A few states only extend protection order relief to victims of stalking
or harassment who share another qualifying relationship with the offender.164
Stalking protection orders might provide an alternative route to protection
against forced marriage in circumstances where a domestic violence protection
order is unavailable—for example, where minor children are prohibited from
filing against parents or relatives, engagement relationships do not qualify, or
stalking or harassment is not qualifying conduct.165 However, some states explicitly preclude this approach.166 Specific challenges raised by pursuing stalking orders in the context of forced marriage are further discussed in below.
ii.

Sexual Assault

Forced marriages often result in rape.167 Those facing forced marriages
who fear that their marriage will lead to rape may want legal protection to prevent that outcome. A number of states permit victims of sexual assault to seek
civil protection orders against their assailants, regardless of the nature of their
relationship.168 As with stalking, some states have granted victims of sexual assault access to domestic violence protection orders, whereas other states have
created a separate protection order remedy for this group.169 Pursuing protec161

See infra APPENDIX 1.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2(a)(2) (2017); ME.
STAT. tit. 19A, § 4005 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.020(1) (2017); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-15-102(2)(a) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D)(1) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 60.2 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a) (2017).
163
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a)–(b)(3) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-1503(a)(7) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017).
164
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); N.Y. FAM. CT.
LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018).
165
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-102 (2017); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017).
166
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 31503 (West 2018) (restricting access to peace orders to individuals not eligible to seek domestic violence protection orders); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(28)(b) (2018) (precluding
minors from seeking protection orders against parents on grounds of stalking or sexual assault).
167
See supra INTRODUCTION.
168
See infra APPENDIX 1.
169
Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(1)(e), 455.020(1)
(2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(2)(a) (2017), with FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.2(A) (2017).
162
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tion orders as sexual assault victims, in theory, could provide those facing
forced marriages an alternative basis for relief.170 Most states define victims of
sexual assault for protection order purposes as a person who already has been
assaulted.171 In some states, a person facing a forced marriage theoretically
could seek to establish that the efforts to force their marriage amount to an attempted or threatened rape.172 As discussed in Section I.C.2.b, in practice, individuals who have not been sexually assaulted at the time they seek a protection
order may face a number of challenges to securing relief on this basis.
2. Qualifying Conduct
Civil protection order statutes were first created in tandem with policy reforms aimed at enhancing the law enforcement response to domestic violence
and they remain rooted in criminal law.173 In addition to establishing a qualifying relationship with the respondent, a petitioner seeking a civil protection order must demonstrate that the respondent engaged in qualifying conduct. In
most states, this requires a petitioner to prove that the respondent committed or
threatened to commit one or more designated acts. Some states permit the issuance of a protection order upon proof that the respondent has committed any
criminal offense against the petitioner.174 Others limit qualifying conduct to a
defined list of acts—often criminal offenses.175 Still others take a hybrid ap170

In a state like New Jersey, minor children are prohibited from seeking domestic violence
protection orders against parents but permitted to seek sexual assault protection orders
against any assailant, which could include parents. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-14 (West 2017).
This approach may be undercut by the statute’s grant of standing to parents or guardians to
file such petitions on behalf of minor victims of sexual assault, which could be read to prohibit minors from pursuing relief without the involvement of a parent or guardian. Id.; see
also Martin, supra note 105, at 466. By contrast, Michigan and Oregon (two states that also
preclude minors from seeking domestic violence protection orders against parents) explicitly
prohibit minor children from obtaining sexual assault protection orders against adult family
members. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(27)(a) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.763(1)(b)
(2018).
171
See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/103 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-1(a)(2) (2017);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950a (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017).
172
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(1)(e), 455.020(1) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-14 (West
2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(7) (2017) (including any person who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of any form of rape or sexual battery); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5133(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.125(1), (3) (2017).
173
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 71–72; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 9–10.
174
In such states, it may be left to the courts to develop the contours. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
§ 16-1003 (2018) (requiring a petitioner to prove that a “criminal offense” has been committed against the petitioner’s person); Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 788 (D.C. 2008) (holding that unlawful entry may constitute a qualifying crime against a petitioner’s person for
purposes of the District’s civil protection order statute if the circumstances indicate that the
petitioner’s physical safety was at risk).
175
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2018).
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proach, listing both specific acts or offenses and unspecified “other criminal
conduct” as sufficient to justify relief.176 Qualifying conduct can include not
only completed acts, but also attempts to commit listed offenses,177 and aiding,
abetting, or conspiring in the commission of a listed offense.178
Some states require not only a showing that particular conduct occurred,
but also that it threated the petitioner’s safety.179 Demonstrating the imminence
of a threat to one’s safety may pose a particular challenge to individuals who
are deliberately deprived of information about marriage plans in order to reduce
opportunities for resistance.180
My research identified only one state to date—Texas—that permits the issuance of a protection order upon a finding that a family or household member
engaged in acts or omissions “forcing or coercing a child to enter into a marriage.”181 In addition, the District of Columbia permits the issuance of a protection order upon a finding that a respondent committed any criminal offense
against the petitioner, and the District criminalizes forced marriage, which
means that a petitioner arguably could seek a protection order on the basis of a
threatened forced marriage there.182 In most states, a petitioner seeking a protection order in the context of a forced marriage must allege that the respondent
has committed another qualifying crime against her.
a. Physical Violence
Individuals subjected to acts and threats of violence have the clearest path
to securing relief. All states designate crimes or acts of physical violence as
qualifying conduct;183 most include threats of physical harm;184 and a number
176

See infra APPENDIX 3.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2017); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6320 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3906 (2017); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-1 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); ME.
STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4002 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-21-3 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); 23 PA CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017);
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(9) (2017); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1101 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2017).
178
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-1-2(9), 22-19A-8 (2017) (conspiracy to commit a
listed felony crime can justify the issuance of a “crime of violence” protection order); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017) (conspiracy or solicitation to commit a listed offense
against a qualifying individual).
179
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017).
180
VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8.
181
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.004, 261.001(1)(M) (West 2017).
182
D.C. CODE §§ 16-1005(c), 22-2705(a)(3) (2018).
183
See infra APPENDIX 3.
184
See infra APPENDIX 3.
177
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include kidnapping, unlawful restraint, and false imprisonment.185 Minor petitioners seeking protection against their parents also may need to demonstrate
that the parental conduct at issue did not amount to reasonable parental discipline.186
b. Rape
Petitioners seeking protection against a forced marriage might also seek to
establish that the respondent is conspiring, attempting, or threatening to subject
the petitioner to rape. Such petitioners might consider the attempt to force marriage itself as an attempt to force unwanted sex with the intended spouse.187 The
law has long recognized sexual intimacy as a fundamental feature of the marital
relationship.188 Historically, state codes authorized annulment upon proof of
sexual incapacity,189 and criminalized sex outside of marriage through adultery
and fornication offenses.190 Because of the centrality of sexual intercourse to
185

See infra APPENDIX 3.
See, e.g., Chronister ex rel. Morrison v. Brenneman, 742 A.2d 190, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (The court held that the father’s actions of hitting the child with a belt across the rear
only amounted to corporal punishment, not abuse, which is allowed for parental discipline);
Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 872–73 (S.D. 1997) (Father’s use of force to keep
his daughter in a sitting position was not abuse and was within reasonable parental discipline; however, the accompanying aggression and volatile language could make the action
amount to actionable conduct); John P.W. ex rel. Adam W. v. Dawn D.O., 591 S.E.2d 260,
263, 265–66 (W. Va. 2003) (It is within the right of a parent to temporarily restrain their
child for means of talking to them. The mother’s actions of grabbing her son’s arm fit within
this definition and constitute reasonable parental discipline).
187
See, e.g., Forced Marriage Initiative—Success Story—Stefanie, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR.,
http://preventforcedmarriage.org/success-stories-2/ [https://perma.cc/K6WD-Q9AJ] (describing story of “Stefanie,” a thirteen-year-old American citizen who escaped from her father’s home in Saudi Arabia as he was planning her marriage, noting that she was afraid of
being raped by her potential husband and facing increasing psychological and physical abuse
by her father and step-mother).
188
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888) (Marriage “is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“The nature of marriage is that, through its
enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy,
and spirituality.”).
189
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (2017) (a marriage may be annulled “between persons
either of whom is at the time physically impotent”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(d) (McKinney 2018) (action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties was physically
incapable of entering into the marriage state may be maintained); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.106 (West 2017) (“an annulment of a marriage [may be granted] if: (1) either party . . .
was permanently impotent at the time of the marriage. . . .”).
190
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2017) (“Whoever lives in an open state of adultery shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-40 (2018) (“Fornication is a
Class B misdemeanor.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501(b) (West 2018) (“A person
who [commits adultery] is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (2017)
(“When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of
186
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marriage, an attempt to force a marriage arguably could constitute an attempt to
force sexual contact between the spouses. When an individual does not consent
to a marriage, it can be inferred that she also would not consent to sex within
that marriage. Thus, a petitioner potentially could argue that a third party’s attempt to force her marriage constitutes an attempt to force the petitioner’s rape
within the marriage, or perhaps amounts to a threat of rape.191 The historical
failure of the criminal justice system to respond to complaints of marital rape
lends credence to fears that individuals forced into marriage may be unprotected from sexual violence.192
Courts have drawn an analogous connection between facilitating a marriage and facilitating sex in the context of underage marriages. In at least two
cases, courts convicted parents who enabled their minor children to marry before the children reached the minimum marriage of child endangerment or contributing to the delinquency of a minor.193 Each conviction rested, in part, on
the assumption that the marriage would result in the child engaging in sex with
her spouse, despite that neither court appeared to have been presented with evidence of whether or not sexual relations actually had occurred within the marriage.194 These courts did not take up the issue of whether the parents’ actions
could amount to a conspiracy to commit rape. Indeed, the courts’ analyses appear to assume that the sex acts occurring within the marriages would be confornication, which is a misdemeanor.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2017) (“[persons]
guilty of the crime of adultery or fornication shall be liable to indictment and, on conviction,
shall be severally punished. . . .”). See generally Laurence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation,
and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (2002).
191
Commentators similarly have argued that state laws that permit parents to consent to the
marriage of a minor under the age of consent essentially permit parents to consent to a minor’s ongoing statutory rape. Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the
Spousal Exemption to Statutory Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 345 (2017).
192
See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1492 (2000).
193
People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976); State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d
709, 714–15 (Ohio 1958); see also Associated Press, Minors’ Forced Marriages Lead to 3
Arrests, L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 20, 1996) (an Iraqi refugee was charged with child abuse and his
wife was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor after allegedly forcing his
thirteen and fourteen year-old daughters to marry men more than fifteen years older than
they were; the husbands were charged with sexual assault of a child).
194
In State v. Gans, the court reasoned that the “propensity among young married couples to
propagate,” as well as the onerous duties of homemaking, were likely to lead to the minor
daughter’s truancy, and were she to remain in school, the mature “knowledge and attitudes”
the minor daughter would gain as a result of her marriage would cause her to act in ways that
would undermine the morals of her classmates. 151 N.E.2d at 714–15; see also Benu, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 227 (quoting Gans to suggest that the “mating instinct” will take over within a
marriage even if the parties are under the statutorily prescribed ages and pointing to harms
that could befall the minor as a result, including being treated as chattel in the marriage, truancy, and the creation of a “chasm” between her and her classmates should she remain in
school).
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sensual. As a result, neither court considered the question of the child’s consent
nor the parent’s intent regarding whether sexual contact would occur consensually. Nonetheless, the courts’ holdings are significant because they equate a
parent’s facilitation of marriage with a parent’s facilitation of sex between the
spouses in that marriage, and find parents criminally responsible for exposing
their children to harms that could result from that sexual conduct.
Although many states authorize protection orders on the basis of sexual assault only if an assault already has occurred,195 several states permit petitioners
who have experienced attempted or threatened sexual offenses to seek protection as well.196 To find that the conduct of a third party other than the assailant
(such as a parent or relative forcing a marriage) constituted an attempt or threat
of rape, a court likely would have to find that the third party intended or knew
that sexual contact would occur in the marriage, and that such contact would
occur without the petitioner’s consent. A respondent in such case could argue
that he or she had no expectation that the marriage would result in rape, but rather that any sex would occur only with the petitioner’s consent. Petitioners
may have more success with this approach in a jurisdiction like Tennessee,
which permits protection orders to be issued upon a finding that a petitioner
“has been placed in fear of any form of rape,” and thereby centers the court’s
inquiry on the petitioner’s understanding of the respondent’s conduct.
Alternatively, equating attempts to force marriage with attempted or threatened rape may have greater force when a child is legally incapable of consenting to sexual contact. Statutory rape laws establish an age before which minors
are presumed unable to consent to sex, thereby criminalizing sex with all minors below that age, regardless of consent.197 Yet, state laws on marriage age
complicate this argument. If a state approves a marriage involving a minor below that age of consent, the state ostensibly sanctions sexual relations between

195

See sources cited supra note 171.
See sources cited supra note 172.
197
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(3) (2017) (engaging in sexual intercourse with
someone under age fourteen who is at least three years younger); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3
(2017) (sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 16); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.020 (West 2018) (sexual act with someone unable to consent. “A person is deemed
incapable of consent when he or she is . . . less than sixteen (16) years old. . . .”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2017) (“Statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when: (1) The victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than fifteen (15) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) years but
less than ten (10) years older than the victim. . . .”). See generally Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 465
(2000); ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2004) (fifty-state survey of statutory rape laws and requirements).
196
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the minor and his or her spouse.198 A few states expressly exempt sex between
spouses from statutory rape offenses.199
Although the attempt to force a marriage could be argued to constitute a
threat of rape for these reasons, my research has not identified a court that has
made such a finding. Given the novel nature of the claim, it may be unlikely
that a court would do so.
c.

Non (Physically) Violent Conduct

Those facing forced marriages who experience non-physically violent
means of coercion have a harder road to a remedy. The limited data on forced
marriage in the United States suggests that those trying to force marriages often
use emotional, psychological, and financial means of coercion, such as threatening to harm or kill themselves, isolation, social ostracization; declaring the
ruin of a family’s reputation; and threatening to withhold financial support,
kick the individual out of the house, or have the individual deported.200 Although these tactics exert significant power over potential victims, such conduct only will support the issuance of a protection order in most states if it constitutes a criminal offense.201
Individuals subjected to forms of coercion, other than the use or threat of
physical violence, are ineligible for civil protection orders in a number of
states.202 Petitioners in states with broader designations of qualifying conduct
may be able to secure relief by demonstrating they suffered destruction of
property,203 animal cruelty,204 purposeful isolation,205 or other conduct that in198

Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Statutory Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 361–62 (2017).
199
GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 197, at 10, stating:
In some states, marriage is a defense to all [statutory rape] crimes listed (e.g., Alaska, District of
Columbia, West Virginia); other states exclude some of the more aggravated [statutory rape] offenses from this exemption (e.g., Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi). In a few states [e.g., South
Carolina], the criminal [statutory rape] statutes identify age limits for the marriage exemptions.
200

HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8–9.
Legal scholars have explored how the restriction of the civil protection order remedy to
criminal conduct likewise presents obstacles to legal relief for those subjected to psychological and economic forms of domestic violence. See GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 46; Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2009).
202
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15 (2017);
IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720
(West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-152.9 (2017).
203
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2017) (criminal mischief); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301 (West
2018), 6320 (West 2018) (destroying personal property); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017)
(malicious property damage); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017) (criminal mischief); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (2018); N.Y. FAM.
201
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terfered with their liberty or caused emotional distress.206 In most states, the
most viable path to relief where only non-physical conduct has been used requires situating the petitioner’s experiences within the criminal offenses of
child endangerment or stalking and harassment. Each of these alternatives present challenges in the forced marriage context. A few states include coercion,
restraint of liberty, or other forms of emotional or psychological abuse as qualifying conduct; yet even under these grounds petitioners sometimes must
demonstrate a nexus to physical violence.207
i.

Child Endangerment/Contributing to the Delinquency of a
Minor

A minor petitioner seeking protection against her parents could allege that
their conduct amounts to child endangerment or contributes to the delinquency
of a minor.208 In some states, a finding of child endangerment may require
proof that a defendant willfully engaged in conduct likely to harm a child’s
physical, mental, and moral welfare.209 Under broader conceptions of child endangerment in some states, a defendant need not have a specific intent to injure
the morals of the child.210 Rather, the defendant simply must undertake the relevant actions knowingly and not by accident.211 At least one court has upheld a
parent’s conviction for child endangerment after finding that a father “knowingly played an active part in the [marriage] ceremony” of his thirteen-year-old
daughter to a seventeen-year-old boy.212

CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018) (criminal mischief); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. §§ 813.122 (2017), 48.02 (2017).
204
IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601
(2017).
205
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.074.1(6) (2017) (“A person commits the crime of domestic assault
in the third degree if the act involves a family or household member or an adult . . . and . . .
(6) The person knowingly attempts to cause or causes the isolation of such family or household member by unreasonably and substantially restricting or limiting such family or household member’s access to other persons. . . .”).
206
See infra Section II.C.2.c.iii, iv.
207
Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133 (physical violence constitutes qualifying conduct in all
states, coercion, restraint of liberty, or false imprisonment covered in only one third of states
(most requiring a threat of physical harm), and psychological or emotional abuse covered in
only one third of states).
208
See infra APPENDIX 3.
209
People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222, 226 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. The court upheld the conviction in spite of its recognition that the father believed his
actions were beneficial to the child, as he viewed her marriage as “a desirable alternative to
fornication,” which he feared would occur after his daughter expressed interest in the boy to
her brother.
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Contributing to the delinquency of a minor generally requires conduct that
causes or encourages a child to become delinquent, in need of services, or
abused or neglected.213 Courts may be empowered to make a finding of “contributing” without finding that a minor actually was delinquent, since contributing statutes may encompass conduct that not only results in delinquency, but
also that is likely or “tends” to do so.214
ii.

Stalking and Harassment

In some states, a petitioner might be able to show that emotionally, psychologically, or financially coercive conduct amounts to stalking or criminal harassment.215 Criminal stalking and harassment offenses typically require proof
that: (1) a perpetrator engaged in a course of conduct directed at the petitioner;
(2) the conduct caused the victim to fear for her safety or to feel seriously
alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; and (3) the perpetrator intended to make the
victim feel that way, or should have known that his or her actions would have
that result.216 Establishing that the conduct of an individual attempting to force
a marriage constitutes stalking or harassment presents several significant challenges.
First, a petitioner must prove that a respondent acted with the requisite intent. Some states require proof that a respondent had a specific intent to harass;
whereas others require intentional or knowing conduct, or the lack of a legitimate purpose.217 Establishing specific intent may be particularly challenging in
forced marriage cases involving a parent, which could require a petitioner to
prove that the parent intended to harass or terrify the petitioner rather than to
advance the petitioner’s best interests (as the parent understood them). Likewise, a petitioner could be required to prove that the parent’s attempts to coerce
a marriage served no legitimate purpose. In such circumstances, a court might
be required to identify the point at which a parent’s potentially legitimate purpose (e.g. wanting to secure a child’s future, or guide a child toward life deci213

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.24 (West 2017).
State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ohio 1958) (upholding parental convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor after the defendants instructed their eleven-year-old
daughter to misrepresent her age to a county clerk and consented to the issuance of her marriage license, concluding that actively enabling a minor under the lawful age to marry tends
to cause delinquency because her marriage was likely to cause her to become truant and endanger the morals of her classmates because of the “mature” knowledge and attitudes she
will acquire as a spouse); see also Marriage or Rape?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 1996, 7:00 PM)
(a mother was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor after her two thirteen
and fourteen year-old daughters were allegedly forced to marry substantially older men; the
father was charged with child abuse and the husbands were charged with rape).
215
See infra APPENDIX 3; see also GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 41.
216
See generally Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS
L. J. 781 (2013); Tracey B. Carter, Local, State, and Federal Responses to Stalking: Are Anti-Stalking Laws Effective?, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333, 351 (2016).
217
Caplan, supra note 216, at 796.
214
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sions a parent believes beneficial) becomes illegitimate (e.g. forcing a marriage
regardless of a child’s wishes, or forcing a marriage to the detriment of a
child’s welfare).
Proving that a respondent’s conduct had the requisite impact on the petitioner’s own mental state presents a second significant challenge. Some states
require a petitioner to prove that she actually feared for her safety or felt seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; whereas others require a petitioner to
show that a reasonable person in her circumstances could feel the same; and
still other states require both.218 In theory, a petitioner could attempt to satisfy
this requirement simply by showing that she believed the respondent aimed his
or her conduct to force her into a marriage that she did not wish to enter. The
petitioner could allege that her fear or alarm stemmed from the consequences of
the potential union itself, or the consequences she would face by resisting the
marriage. Some states presume that certain types of conduct, such as creating a
disturbance at a petitioner’s place of employment or school; repeatedly telephoning, following, or keeping a petitioner under surveillance; improperly concealing or threatening to remove the petitioner’s minor child from the jurisdiction; or threatening physical force, confinement or restraint cause emotional
distress.219 Petitioners also might be required to demonstrate that court action
against particular tactics is constitutionally permitted.220 Respondents may argue that findings of stalking or harassment rooted in a respondent’s speech may
violate the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment.221
iii.

Criminal Coercion/Restraint of Liberty

In a minority of states, a petitioner could seek a protection order on the basis that a respondent has wrongfully coerced or restricted her liberty.222 Professors Leigh Goodmark and Margaret Johnson have noted that although such
provisions look beyond the direct infliction of physical violence, provisions often define the relevant conduct “by reference to actual or threatened physical
force or violence.”223 For example, to demonstrate that a respondent subjected
her to coercion or an interference with personal liberty, a petitioner typically
must prove that the respondent compelled the petitioner by force, threat of
force, or intimidation “to engage in conduct from which [the petitioner] has the
right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which [the petitioner]

218

Id. at 795; Carter, supra note 216, at 359.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018).
220
Caplan, supra note 216, at 808–26; Carter, supra note 216, at 374–78; see also infra Section II.C.2.d.
221
Carter, supra note 216, at 377.
222
Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34.
223
GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 38; see also Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34.
219
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has a right or privilege to engage.”224 Illinois further grants a cause of action to
minor petitioners who allege that a caretaker forced them to “participate in or
witness the physical abuse, confinement, or restraint of another,”225 and designates “knowing, repeated, and unnecessary sleep deprivation” as an actionable
form of physical abuse.226
iv.

Emotional Abuse

Several states also permit a petitioner to seek a protection order on the basis of emotionally abusive conduct not tied to physical violence (outside the
realm of stalking or harassment). Actionable conduct varies by state, and includes the willful deprivation of necessities to a dependent,227 “interfering with
[a] petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or education or engaging in
conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or education[],”228 “repeatedly
driving by a residence or workplace,”229 “creating fear of physical harm by . . .
psychological abuse or threatening acts,”230 repeatedly telephoning or disturbing the peace of the petitioner,231 and/or causing petitioner emotional distress or
injury.232
d. Constitutionally Protected Parental Conduct
Across all allegations of qualifying conduct, a minor petitioner seeking to
restrain a parent will face the added challenge of establishing that his or her
parent’s conduct falls outside of the constitutionally protected sphere of parental decision-making and reasonable parental discipline. The guarantee of privacy accorded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conveys
to parents the fundamental liberty interest in the care and control of their children.233 This interest authorizes parents to make major life decisions for their
224

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018);
ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 33.018 (2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 135.60
(Consol. 2008).
225
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103 (2018).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(1), (4) (2018).
229
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2018).
230
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2017).
231
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (West 2018).
232
See., e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1041(1) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017)
(extreme psychological abuse); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4013-2(D) (2018) (severe emotional distress); see also Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34.
233
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (striking down a state law allowing thirdparty petitions for child visitation rights over parental objection, holding that “[t]he liberty
interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court”); see also James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 J. L.
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minor children in areas such as religion, education, and health.234 Parents are
entitled to use reasonable forms of discipline to maintain control over their
children and secure compliance with their directives.235
Nonetheless, parents’ interest in controlling their children is not absolute. It
is constrained by the state’s responsibility as parens patriae to ensure the wellbeing of children236 and by the rights children themselves enjoy.237 This balance
of competing rights and responsibilities means that, for a child to have an actionable claim against a parent, parental conduct must not only qualify under
the relevant statute, but also be shown to exceed the bounds of constitutionally
protected parenting. To overcome this hurdle, a petitioner would be required to
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 210 (2010) (reasoning that the propriety of parental use of corporal
punishment should be understood as a question of the scope of parents’ freedom or discretion to use particular means of discipline in exercising their liberty interests to care and control the upbringing of their children, rather than one of a parent’s “right” to do so).
234
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992) (upholding Pennsylvania’s
abortion statute requiring parental consent and stating that the waiting period provided the
opportunity for parental consultation to discuss the moral consequences of abortion in a familial context); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 588 & n.3, 604, 620–21 (1979) (upholding
Georgia’s mental hospital commitment statute, which permitted parents or guardians to request that their child be committed if there was evidence of mental illness, because parental
decisions regarding a child’s medical care should receive great deference); Pierce v. Soc’y of
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534–35 (1925) (finding
a state compulsory public school attendance law to unconstitutionally infringe on parental
authority to direct the upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923) (holding that state restriction of school curricula to prohibit the teaching of
“modern” languages other than English before the eighth grade unconstitutionally infringed
on parents’ liberty interest in controlling “the education of their own”).
235
Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 868–70 (Mass. 2015) (recognizing the common law parental privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining a child and evaluating its
scope in Massachusetts and a number of other states); State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 453
(Me. 2000) (evaluating the parental privilege to use physical means of discipline under the
laws of Maine and numerous states); Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense—Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 413, 417 (1998) (analyzing the contours of the parental privilege to use reasonable force in discipline as established by state statutes and common law and collecting relevant statutes and cases). Courts and commentators have noted that although it has not directly ruled on this question, Supreme Court precedent impliedly authorizes corporal punishment
as a potentially permissible means of carrying out parents’ authority to raise their children as
they see fit, as it has permitted the use of corporal punishment in schools. Wilder, 748 A.2d
at 453; Johnson, supra note 201, at 427–28.
236
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88. See generally Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved
with Good Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child
Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803, 825 (2015) (parental power balanced
against the state’s interest through parens patriae power).
237
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.” Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976). See generally Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 40 (collecting and summarizing constitutional cases involving children’s rights).
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show that the parental conduct at issue was not an exercise of reasonable parental discipline to maintain control over the child, and was undertaken in furtherance of an improper objective.238
Depending on the circumstances, a petitioner might be able to establish that
the relevant conduct does not qualify as reasonable parental discipline; for example, because it involved excessive punishment.239 To show that conduct was
undertaken in furtherance of an improper objective, petitioners could argue that
forcing a child to enter a marriage against his or her wishes is not within the parental prerogative, and conduct undertaken to advance that end is not for a
child’s benefit.240
It could be argued that the laws in several states that require parental consent to the marriage of a minor bring a child’s marriage within the scope of protected parental decision making.241 Such statutes permit parents to prevent children from entering into marriages by withholding their consent to the issuance
of a marriage license. Essentially, these statutes create a temporary parental veto during a defined period of minority over marriages that parents believe to be
harmful or unwise. Thus, the laws preserve parents’ authority to control the upbringing of children by permitting parents to delay a child’s marriage until the
child reaches adulthood, and perhaps preclude the union altogether if the intended spouses change their minds in the interim. These statutes do not, however, grant parents the affirmative authority to choose a child’s spouse and direct a child to marry, regardless of the child’s wishes.242
3. The Impediments of Minority
States created civil protection orders to address violence in adult relationships, and the remedy remains adult-centered.243 But most states also have
made the remedy available to protect children from abuse in family and other

238

Some states explicitly exempt constitutionally protected parenting activities from otherwise qualifying conduct. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018) (the “reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis” does not give rise to an actionable claim of willful deprivation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-2 (West 2017) (establishing
an affirmative defense to a charge of criminal restraint that the defendant was a relative or
legal guardian who acted to restrain an unemancipated minor solely to control the child).
239
Johnson, supra note 235, at 467–69.
240
Id.; see also sources cited supra note 13.
241
Understanding State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Exceptions, supra note 6.
242
Id.
243
Martin, supra note 105, at 467, 487; see also Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen
Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 331, 339 (1995); Roger J.R. Levesque, Dating Violence, Adolescents, and the Law, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 339, 342–43 (1997); Pamela Saperstein,
Teen Dating Violence: Eliminating Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders, 39 FAM. L.
Q. 181, 183 (2005) (noting that the issue of violence in teen dating relationships was not a
concern when states started to enact domestic violence statutes).
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relationships.244 In recognition of children’s age, immaturity, lack of experience, relative helplessness, and reliance on family members and others to protect them, the law accords children “minority” status to protect their interests.245
States limit children’s legal rights and children’s ability to control their legal
affairs until they reach the age of legal majority.246 Because state law determines the ages at which minors assume various rights and duties, these ages often vary by jurisdiction.247 Children can be “emancipated” from the restrictions
of minority upon the occurrence of certain life events, such as marriage or enlistment in the military, or by court order.248 Yet, emancipation alone does not
automatically confer to minors all the legal rights and protections accorded to
adults.249 Consequently, emancipated minors may not be viewed as adult parties
when seeking civil protection orders. Whether minors can seek protection orders to prevent a forced marriage depends on whether and how states grant minors standing as protected parties and define minors’ legal capacity to advance
their own claims.250
a. Standing
The accessibility of civil protection orders to minors first depends on
whether a jurisdiction accords them standing—the right to seek legal relief.251
A number of states expressly grant standing to some or all minors. Of these,
some explicitly grant standing to minors of any age that is coextensive with the
standing granted to adults,252 whereas others grant standing only to minors
244

See infra Section III.C.3.b.
KRAMER, supra note 24, § 1:1, at 6.
246
Age of Majority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (9th ed. 2009); NATIONAL SURVEY OF
STATE LAWS 522–25 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 7th ed. 2015) (compiling state statutes regarding
emancipation and ages of majority).
247
KRAMER, supra note 24, § 14:2, at 982 (citing Valley Nat’l Bank v. Glover, 159 P.2d 292
(Ariz. 1945); Jacobsen v. Lenhart, 195 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. 1964); Zelnick v. Adams, 606
S.E.2d 843, 846 (Va. 2005)) (indicating the legislature’s authority to establish the age of majority).
248
Martin, supra note 105, at 476.
249
See Wickham v. Torley, 71 S.E. 881, 882 (Ga. 1911) (“[E]ven emancipation of the minor
from parental control . . . does not remove his disability and clothe him with the power to
contract.”); Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 89 N.E. 796, 797 (Ill. 1909) (“[T]he contract of an
infant is, in general, voidable by him, and gains no additional force from the fact that he is
engaged in business for himself or is emancipated.”); Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713,
719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (finding no authority for the proposition that “solely because of
emancipation, the infant is sui juris for all purposes”).
250
Martin, supra note 105, at 469–70.
251
Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
252
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3), (5) (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 372(b)(1)(C) (West 2018); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a) (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 161003(a)(1)–(5) (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(a) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§§ 60.1.1, 60.1.4, 60.2A (2017). Tennessee explicitly grants minors standing to seek protection orders based on the same qualifying relationships available to adults but does not speci245
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within a certain age group or those who share a particular relationship with the
respondent.253 Consequently, a number of states clearly accord at least some
minors standing to seek protection orders against parents,254 other relatives,255
individuals who are stalking or harassing them,256 and sexual assailants.257 Minors also have standing to seek a protection order against an intended spouse in
some states if the minor shows that the respondent qualifies as a fiancé258 or dating partner.259
For several reasons, minors arguably also have standing to seek protection
orders in states with statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.260 First,
absent a statute or constitutional provision to the contrary, children generally
have the same rights to legal protection and redress for wrongs as adults.261 Sefy whether minors have standing to seek protection orders against sexual assailants or stalkers. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5) (2017).
253
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017) (granting minors standing against spouses, intimate
partner cohabitants, and dating partners); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(2), (7) (2017) (restricting civil protection orders to adults and defining adult as an individual aged seventeen and
older); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.726 (2018) (granting standing to minor spouses and minors in
sexually intimate relationships if the respondent is eighteen years of age or older); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a) (2017) (defining “adult” to include any person who is either at
least sixteen years old or legally married); D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Iowa 1998).
254
See infra APPENDIX 4.
255
See infra APPENDIX 4.
256
See infra APPENDIX 4.
257
See infra APPENDIX 4.
258
See infra APPENDIX 4.
259
See infra APPENDIX 4.
260
Courts in several states have interpreted ambiguous protection order statutes to extend
standing to minors. See D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel, 577 N.W.2d at 646; Beermann v. Beermann,
559 N.W.2d 868, 869–70, 874 (S.D. 1997); Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 576
(W. Va. 2006).
261
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass. 1975); see also Petersen v. City &
Cty. of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969) (“[I]n general, minor children are entitled to the same redress for wrongs done them as are any other persons.”) (citing Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 906 (N.H. 1930)); Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790–91
(Ill. 1978) (“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless clearly debarred from so doing by some statute or constitutional provision.”) (citing Walgreen Co. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 153 N.E. 831, 833 (Ill. 1926)); Norris v. Mingle, 29 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind.
1940) (“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless the same are
clearly barred on account of some statutory or constitutional provision.”); Gillette v. Del. L.
& W.R. Co., 102 A. 673, 673 (N.J. 1917) (holding that an infant’s minority does not prevent
him from initiating suit to redress legal claims); Henry ex rel. Henry v. City of N.Y., 724
N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1999) (“[A]n infant’s right of action ‘at its origination is and remains
in the infant. . . . Infancy does not incapacitate the infant from bringing the action.’ ”) (quoting Murphy v. Vill. of Fort Edward, 107 N.E. 716, 717 (N.Y. 1915)); Harrison v. Wallton’s
Ex’r, 30 S.E. 372, 373 (Va. 1898) (holding that minors can bring suit through adult representatives to enforce their rights during their minority); Hunter v. N. Mason High Sch., 529
P.2d 898, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“The legal disabilities of minors have been firmly established by common law and statute. They were established for the protection of minors,
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cond, constitutional provisions and statutes in several states explicitly guarantee
to minors a general right to access the courts for redress of grievances.262 Third,
by establishing the procedures to be followed when courts are presented with
claims by minor parties who lack legal capacity to sue, court rules in many
states manifest a presumption that individuals of any age are entitled to pursue
legal claims.263 Furthermore, because protection order statutes are remedial in
nature, the principle of liberal construction dictates that courts should construe
such statutes liberally to benefit the class of individuals that the statutes were
intended to protect.264 Applying this principle, courts faced with a choice beand not as a bar to the enforcement of their rights.”) (citing 43 C.J.S. Infants § 19 (1945)),
aff’d, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (W. Va. 1976)
(“We perceive no reason why minor children should not enjoy the same right to legal redress
for wrongs done to them as others enjoy.”).
262
Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors from
Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 U. S.F. L. REV. 853, 905–09 tbl.1 (2009) (compiling state constitutional provisions and statutes according minors a right of access to the
courts).
263
Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue in Federal
Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 356 (1991) (“Congress designed [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 17(c) to promote and protect the ability of minor plaintiffs and defendants to
pursue their legal interests with such guidance as the trial court deems necessary in the best
interests of the minor. The rule reflects a belief that minors as well as adults should have access to the courts to protect their legal rights.”); Jeruss, supra note 262, at 872–73, 910–34
tbl.2 (detailing the laws and court rules addressing minors’ legal capacity in the fifty states
and noting that nearly all states have incorporated Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure into their statutes, or contain a similar rule requiring that a guardian or next friend
appear on behalf of minors).
264
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2018) (“This Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes. . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (West 2017)
(“Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice.”); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(b)
(2017) (“This article shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the following purposes: (1) To assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that
the law can provide. . . ”); Salvattera v. Ramirez, 105 A.3d 1003, 1010 (D.C. 2014) (“ ‘the
plain intent of the legislature was an expansive reading of the Act’; it ‘must be liberally construed in furtherance of its remedial purpose.’ ”) (quoting Araya v. Keleta, 31 A.3d 78, 81
(D.C. 2011)); Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 772 (N.D. 2012) (“As a remedial statute, [the statute] is to be construed liberally to allow courts to accomplish the goal of protection orders, which is protecting victims of domestic violence from further harm”); Saville v.
Ude, 776 N.W.2d 31, 35 (N.D. 2009) (“As a remedial statute, the provisions of § 14–07.1–
02 are construed liberally, allowing the courts to accomplish the objectives behind protection
orders.”); Raynes v. Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Vt. 2008) (as a remedial statute, Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Act “must be liberally construed to ‘suppress the evil and advance
the remedy intended by the Legislature.’ ”) (quoting Dep’t of Corr. v. Human Rights
Comm’n, 917 A.2d 451, 454 (Vt. 2006)); Swensen v. Swensen, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (“As a remedial statute, the Domestic Abuse Act receives liberal construction
. . . in favor of an injured person.”); N.J. DIV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUDENT MANUAL 2-1 (2003) (“The provisions of the domestic violence laws should be liberally construed by the law enforcement officer in favor of action
protecting a victim of domestic violence,” referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19).
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tween alternate interpretations of protection order statutes should select those
that provide the greatest protection for victims of abuse.265 Finally, public policy supports extending standing to all individuals, regardless of age, when the
law is silent to instill confidence in the legal system and to encourage those
who need help to seek it.266 For all of these reasons, where protection order
statutes are ambiguous, minors should be presumed to have the same standing
to seek relief as adults.
Minors clearly lack standing to seek domestic violence civil protection orders under any circumstances in at least one state,267 and lack standing to file
against parents268 or other relatives269 in several others. Emancipated minors are
treated differently across states. Whereas several states explicitly confer standing on emancipated minors as adults,270 at least one state explicitly treat some
emancipated minors as minors for purposes of the protection order remedy.271
Several states explicitly grant standing to adults to seek protection orders
on minors’ behalf. Some do so restrictively, granting standing only to adults
who share a particular relationship with a minor, including parents, guardians,
and custodians;272 family or household members;273 or those who play a particu-

265

See, e.g., Katherine B.T., 640 S.E.2d at 576 (finding that minors have standing to seek
protection orders as “persons” based, in part, on the principle of liberal construction codified
within the statute).
266
Buckholz v. Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (“Courts must stand
prepared to protect the rights of all citizens, including teenagers. Denying a teen-aged litigant access to our courts simply because he happens to be a minor not only tends to lessen
the confidence of young people in our legal system but adds credence to the existence of the
‘generation gap.’ And it may even help widen that gap.”); see Martin, supra note 105, at
514–15.
267
WIS. STAT. § 813.12(1)(am) (2017) (defining “domestic abuse” as only being perpetrated
by and against “adult[s]”). Minors do have standing to seek protection orders against sexual
assault and stalking in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 813.125(2)(b) (2017); see also MO. REV.
STAT. § 455.010(2), (7) (2017) (restricting civil protection orders to adults and defining adult
as an individual aged seventeen and older); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a) (2017) (defining “adult” to include any person who is either at least sixteen years old or legally married).
268
See infra APPENDIX 4.
269
See infra APPENDIX 4.
270
See ALA. CODE § 30-5-5(a)(1) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002(2) (2017); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-3(b) (2017) (emancipation by marriage); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(2) (2017);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a), (d), (e) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (2017); 8
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1), (3) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(2) (2017).
271
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d) (2017) (married minors).
272
See infra APPENDIX 5. The Vermont Supreme Court interpreted its statute to confer standing only to parents to seek protection orders on behalf of minors. See Wood ex rel. Eddy v.
Eddy, 833 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Vt. 2003) (agreeing that a mother had standing to seek a protection order on behalf of her minor daughter); Bigelow v. Bigelow, 721 A.2d 98, 100 (Vt.
1998) (holding that the statute “does not encompass petitions by third parties, even grandparents, on behalf of minor children.”).
273
See infra APPENDIX 5.
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lar professional role, such as district attorneys,274 domestic violence program or
shelter staff and volunteers,275 guardians ad litem,276 or representatives of state
agencies.277 Other states permit a broader array of adults to represent minors’
interests.278 More restrictive definitions of qualifying adults may present barriers in the forced marriage context, as minor petitioners may be seeking to restrain the very adults upon whom they must rely to advance claims for protection.
b. Capacity
The accessibility of protection orders for minors depends not only on
whether minors have standing to sue, but also on whether they have the legal
capacity to represent their own interests in the litigation. Capacity is a party’s
“satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal age or soundness of mind,
that determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.”279 Minors generally lack the
capacity to take civil legal action independently; instead, they typically must
advance legal claims through an adult representative.280
Concerns about the prevalence of dating violence and sexual assault victimization among teens, coupled with data showing teens’ reluctance to disclose such abuse to adults, have led several states to depart from this general
rule and grant adolescents the legal capacity to seek protection orders independently.281 Several states grant capacity to seek protection orders to all minors who have reached a minimum age282 and/or share a particular relationship
with the respondent.283 Other states require courts to assess capacity on a case-

274

See infra APPENDIX 5.
See infra APPENDIX 5.
276
See infra APPENDIX 5.
277
See infra APPENDIX 5.
278
See infra APPENDIX 5.
279
Capacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
280
2 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 11:13
(2012) (unemancipated minors generally do not have capacity to sue); 4 JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 17.21[3][a] & n.16 (3d ed. 2014); Linda D. Elrod,
Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869,
878–79 (2007) (providing a historical overview of children’s legal rights).
281
See infra APPENDIX 5.
282
Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1)(C)–(D) (West 2018); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6301(a) (West 2018) (granting minors twelve and older capacity to seek protection orders
on their own against any qualifying respondent), with MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(2),
455.020 (2016) (minors seventeen and older can seek protection orders on their own against
any qualifying respondent).
283
Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(2)–(3) (2018) (granting minors twelve and older capacity to seek protection orders against intimate partners, and minors 16 and older against
any qualifying respondent), with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(b)(1) (West 2017) (granting minors of any age capacity to seek protection orders against dating partners).
275
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by-case basis.284 When a minor appears in court with no adult representative to
seek a protection order, states authorize courts to take varying steps to protect
the minor’s interests, including appointment of an attorney285 or a guardian ad
litem.286
On the other end of the spectrum, a handful of states make clear that minors lack capacity to proceed independently in protection order proceedings,
and authorize certain adults to represent minor petitioners’ interests.287 At least
one state deprives otherwise emancipated minors of capacity in protection order
proceedings.288
Most protection order statutes are silent or ambiguous regarding minors’
capacity to represent their own interests.289 In such jurisdictions, statutes, case
law, and court rules governing capacity often permit courts to determine what
is needed to protect the minor’s interests in the litigation.290 Courts in states that
284

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3602(A) (2017) (parents, guardians, and custodians
generally must file petitions for minor victims “unless the court determines otherwise”);
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(a) (2017) (minors sixteen and older can be granted capacity to
seek protection orders on their own against spouses or co-parents “if the court determines
that the minor has sufficient maturity and judgment and that it is in the best interests of the
minor”).
285
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a-1)(4) (2018) (court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor who appears without an adult representative if such appointment
will not unduly delay adjudication of the case).
286
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1) (West 2018) (a court may appoint a guardian ad litem,
after considering any objections by the minor petitioner to the appointment of particular individuals and if the appointment will not unduly delay adjudication of the case).
287
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-2(4), 30-5-5(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (providing that only adults
may seek protection orders, and permitting protection orders to be filed by plaintiffs or by
parents, guardians, custodians, or the State Department of Human Resources on behalf of
minors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2017) (requiring protection orders to be
filed on behalf of minors by adult family or household members or by people working for
domestic violence shelters and programs); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2017) (“A person
who is not a minor may seek relief under this article by filing a petition with the superior
court alleging one or more acts of family violence. A person who is not a minor may also
seek relief on behalf of a minor by filing such a petition.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(D)
(2017) (“An adult may seek relief under this Part by filing a petition with the court alleging
abuse by the defendant. Any parent, adult household member, or district attorney may seek
relief on behalf of any minor child. . . .”); ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4005(1) (2017) (permitting
only adults responsible for a minor or the department of child and family services to seek a
protection order on behalf of a minor); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106(a) (2018) (“An adult or an
emancipated minor may seek relief under this chapter for that person or any parent, adult
household member, or guardian ad litem may seek relief under this chapter on behalf of minor children . . . by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.”).
288
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2017) (classifying married minors as minors
for capacity purposes).
289
Martin, supra note 105, at 483.
290
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1) (West 2018); MICH. CT. R. 3.703(F)(1)
(providing that minor petitioners in protection order proceedings must proceed through next
friends, who must be adults not statutorily disqualified from service. Next friends are authorized to serve without court appointment where a minor is fourteen or older); Parrish v. Price,
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follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) have the discretion to appoint a
next friend, guardian ad litem, or make any other order ensuring a minor’s interests are adequately protected, including permitting a minor to proceed
alone.291 Courts do not have this latitude in all states, and a number of states require courts to appoint adults to represent the interests of minor parties in all
71 So. 3d 132, 133 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011) (holding minors have standing to seek domestic violence injunctions but lack capacity to do so on their own; they must have an appointed representative or a next friend); Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 870–71 (S.D. 1997)
(holding where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult representative, trial
courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no guardian is necessary and permit the minor to proceed alone). Judicial benchbooks in some states provide
guidance to courts regarding capacity where statutes are ambiguous. See, e.g., Colo. Domestic Violence Benchbook, Ch. 2, at 2-3 (2014) (protection orders may be sought to protect
minors if action is brought through a person empowered to act on the minor’s behalf);
COMMONWEALTH OF MA. TRIAL COURT GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE: ABUSE
PREVENTION PROCEEDING 19 (2011), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/209a/guidelines2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZU-S7DJ]. (“The court should not refuse to act solely because
the court cannot secure the presence of a parent or guardian, particularly where the minor is
mature (16 or 17), and where the defendant is an intimate partner or a family member who is
not a parent or guardian or where there is an imminent threat of bodily injury.”). An attorney
general opinion addresses this issue in Virginia, Op. Att’y Gen. 10-116, at 1,4 (2011) (opining that only emancipated minors have capacity to file a petition for a protection orders
without an adult representative; minors may appear before a magistrate to seek an emergency temporary protection order on their own).
291
See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17(c) (19857); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60217(c) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2017(c) (West 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-6-17(c) (2017); ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(c); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 17(c); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 17(f);
COLO. R. CIV. P. 17(c); DEL. SUP. CT. R. CIV. P. 17(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210(b); HAW. R. CIV.
P. 17(c); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 17(c); ME. R. CIV. P. 17(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 17(b); MISS. R. CIV.
P. 17(c); MONT. R. CIV. P. 17(c); NEV. R. CIV. P. 17(c); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-017(d);
N.D. R. CIV. P. 17(b); OHIO R. CIV. P. 17(B); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(c); TENN. R. CIV. P. 17.03;
VT. R. CIV. P. 17(b); WYO. R. CIV. P. 17(c); Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d
131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) (“under Rule 17(c), a court may appoint a guardian, or it may decline to do so if the child’s interests may be protected in an alternative manner.”); M.S. v.
Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating the “[a]ppointment of a guardian ad litem is considered to be discretionary under the Federal Rules, provided the District Court
enters a finding that the interests of the minor are adequately protected in the event it does
not make such appointment.”); Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir.
1958) (“We spell out the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)] to mean: (1) as a matter of
proper procedure, the court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the [c]ourt
may, after weighing all the circumstances, issue such order as will protect the minor in lieu
of appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may even decide that such appointment is unnecessary, though only after the [c]ourt has considered the matter and made a judicial determination that the infant is protected without a guardian.”); see also Beermann, 559 N.W.2d
at 870–71 (holding that where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult representative, trial courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no
guardian is necessary and permit the minor to proceed alone). But see Katherine B.T v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 577 (W.Va. 2006) (holding that West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
17(c) requires that “a minor must have either a next friend or guardian in order to prosecute
or defend civil actions generally.”). See also Jeruss, supra note 262, at 875–78, 905–09
(comparing state procedural rules to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)).
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proceedings.292 Several states permit minors aged fourteen and older to select
their adult representatives, subject to court approval.293
Given the limited data on forced marriage in the United States and the limited experience of domestic violence agencies with forced marriage cases, the
extent to which minors seeking to avoid forced marriages would benefit by extensions of capacity is unclear. States often have extended legal capacity to minors in protection order proceedings to encourage minors to seek help by eliminating the need for minors to first disclose abuse to parents or other adults.294
It is possible that minors facing marriages forced by their parents might
seek the support of another adult before pursuing legal protection. In such circumstances, statutory provisions limiting the adults who can assist minors to
file for protection orders may create a significant obstacle.295 Conversely, it is
possible that minors concerned about protecting their families from scrutiny or
gossip might be willing to proceed only if they do not need to recruit an adult
representative. Research on the needs and desires of minors who could benefit
from civil injunctive relief to prevent forced marriage is sorely needed to inform states as they consider policies to address this issue.
4. Remedies
Protection orders offer a wide range of remedies for protected parties and
provide courts flexibility in crafting individually tailored relief.296 Civil protection order statutes typically include an enumerated list of potential remedies
that address common problems within the domestic violence context. Such lists
often include: prohibitions on assaulting, harassing, threatening, or stalking the
petitioner; stay-away and no-contact orders; orders to vacate a joint residence;
temporary custody and support awards; mandated domestic violence or substance abuse counseling; monetary awards; and temporary possession of auto292

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 507.110 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-307 (2017); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2018); WIS. STAT. § 803.01(3)(a) (2017); ARK. R. CIV. P. 17(b);
IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.210; KY. R. CIV. P. 17.03(1)-(2); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 683(D)
(2017); MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02; OR. R. CIV. P. 27(A); PA. R. CIV. P.
2027; UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(b).
293
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5203 (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373(a)–(c)
(West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-301(1)–(2) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 12.050(1)–(2)
(2017); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202(a)(1) (McKinney 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-03-01 (2017);
WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.08.050(1)–(2) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 803.01(b)(2)–(3) (2017); ALA. R.
CIV. P. 17(d); MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02; OR. R. CIV. P. 27(B)(1)(a)–
(B)(2)(b); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(d)(3); UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).
294
Martin, supra note 105, at 462–63.
295
Tennessee, for example, permits unemancipated minors to file petitions for protection
orders against a parent only if the petition is signed by another parent or legal guardian.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2017) (permitting unemancipated minors to file petitions
signed by caseworkers against other parties, but only petitions signed by a parent or legal
guardian against a parent or legal guardian).
296
E.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 79.
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mobiles and other personal property.297 In addition to these enumerated remedies, many states also authorize courts to award “catch-all” relief—any other
(constitutionally permissible) orders appropriate to the resolution of the case.298
Because enumerated remedies were not crafted with forced marriage in
mind, they may not be sufficient to meet the needs of petitioners seeking protection in this context, and may not provide courts with a reliable guide to meet
common areas of need. As a result, catch-all provisions may best enable courts
to craft remedies targeted to meet the specific needs of petitioners facing forced
marriage. In the states lacking provisions for catch-all relief, protection orders
may have more limited utility to prevent forced marriage, particularly for petitioners who wish to continue to live or remain in close contact with their families.299
D. The Efficacy of Civil Protection Orders to Prevent Forced Marriage
Despite the challenges identified, civil protection orders show promise as a
remedy to prevent forced marriage. Indeed, because forced marriage is a type
of domestic abuse and gender-based violence, it is natural that individuals
would turn to civil protection orders to address this problem.300 Like individuals
facing other forms of domestic and family violence, those facing forced marriage often need emergency intervention, low barriers to entering the civil justice system, and individually tailored solutions.301 Moreover, those facing
forced marriages often have close and ongoing relationships with the individuals from whom they need protection. The resulting emotional dynamics, the
tactics used by respondents, and the underlying dynamic of control all should
be familiar to courts accustomed to adjudicating petitions for protection orders
in cases of domestic and family violence.
Nonetheless, because civil protection orders were not created with forced
marriage in mind, it is unsurprising that the fit between protection orders and
297

CAL. FAM. CODE § 6220 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2018); Hart, supra note
116, at 15; Johnson, supra note 201, at 1111; Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 913–14,
916–18, 925, 931–32, 937–38, 944, 954, 999; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1044. When first
enacted, protection order remedies often were limited to directives to stay away from and
refrain from further assaulting, harassing, or threatening a petitioner. States have amended
protection order laws since that time to expand available remedies to address other pressing
concerns faced by individuals subjected to abuse. GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 17.
298
The District of Columbia, for example, permits the Court to direct the Respondent “to
perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the
matter.” D.C. CODE § 16-1005(11) (2018); Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 912; see also
A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL
PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) (2016) (collecting state protection order provisions regarding
catch-all relief).
299
VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 6.
300
See supra Section II.B.
301
See supra Part I and Section II.B.
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forced marriage is awkward at best. Today, the availability of civil protection
order to prevent an impending forced marriage depends not on whether a petitioner legitimately fears that she will be forced to marry against her will, but
rather on her age, her relationship with those attempting to coerce her, whether
the tactics used against her qualify as criminal acts, whether a qualifying adult
is required and willing to assist her, and whether available remedies address her
concerns.
The terms under which protection orders are available to prevent or intervene in a forced marriage vary considerably between states. Generally speaking, protection orders are most likely to be available to individuals who are subjected to acts or threats of physical violence by parents, relatives, household
members, or spouses. This group most closely overlaps with petitioners seeking
relief from domestic abuse outside of the forced marriage context. Significant
gaps in relief exist for individuals facing or trapped in forced marriages who
are subjected to nonviolent forms of coercion and for minors who feel unable to
confide in an adult who would be qualified to seek relief on their behalf. Yet,
even these groups are clearly eligible to seek relief in several states.
So long as forced marriage-based protection order claims must be shoehorned into these constructs, the actual availability of protection orders to prevent and intervene in forced marriages will remain uncertain. Access will depend foremost on whether those facing forced marriages have the support of
experts who understand and can inform them about the remedy and assist them
through the process.
III. RESTRAINING FORCED MARRIAGE
Although civil protection orders can be used to prevent forced marriage in
many circumstances, the complexities of doing so undermine the viability of
the remedy as a widely accessible tool. Because individuals facing forced marriages often experience numerous pressures to submit, stay silent, and not dishonor their families, it is especially important that legal remedies are structured
to encourage potential victims to seek help.302 To ensure that potential victims
can reliably access civil legal protection to prevent forced marriage, states
should create a new remedy specifically tailored to address this problem. Many
of the shortcomings of civil protection order statutes in the forced marriage
context have been identified as undermining the efficacy of the remedy to redress domestic violence as well.303 The creation of forced marriage protection
orders presents an opportunity to implement reforms on a smaller scale that also could be adopted in the broader civil protection order context. This section
addresses the benefits and possible criticisms of these proposed reforms.
302

VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8.
GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 45; Johnson, supra note 201, at 1111; GOODMAN &
EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 77.
303
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A. Specialization
To redress the challenges posed to potential forced marriage victims under
existing civil protection order statutes, lawmakers could reform those statutes,
or, alternatively, create a new injunctive remedy specifically designed to prevent and redress forced marriage. The United Kingdom took this approach
when it created forced marriage protection orders (FMPOs) in 2007. Establishing FMPOs in the United States would bring several benefits less easily
achieved through the reform of existing protection order laws, including: aligning the remedy with the lived experiences of potential victims; informing potential victims, advocates, and other support persons that legal protection is
available; and communicating the state’s opprobrium of the practice and support for potential victims. To achieve these goals, FMPOs should be defined
according to, and offer relief tailored to, the experiences of individual petitioners.
1. A Model for Reform
The United Kingdom enacted the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act
2007.304 Under this Act, individuals are eligible to seek Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPOs) if they are being forced, facing attempts to be forced,
or have been forced into a marriage.305 “Force” includes threats and psychological coercion, and orders can be issued based on conduct that occurred within
the U.K. or abroad.306 Individuals seeking to be protected can apply for FMPOs
on their own behalf, and designated government agencies and other individuals
granted leave of court also can apply for FMPOs on behalf of another individual.307 Minors may represent their own interests in FMPO proceedings if they
appear with a legal representative or if the court agrees, or, alternatively, may
have a next friend represent their interests.308 Forced Marriage Protection Orders can restrain not only respondents directly attempting to force a marriage,
but also others who assist, counsel, encourage, or conspire with the respondent.309 In determining whether to issue an FMPO, the court must consider all
relevant circumstances, including “the need to secure the health, safety and
304

Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, c. 20, (U.K.) http://www.legislation.go
v.uk/ukpga/2007/20/pdfs/ukpga_20070020_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTT8-PMKV].
305
Id. § 63A(1)(a)–(b).
306
Id. § 63A(6).
307
Id. § 63C(1)–(3).
308
Forced Marriage Protection Orders: How Can They Protect Me?, HM COURTS &
TRIBUNAL SERVICE FL701, at 2 (Apr. 2017), https://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.g
ov.uk/fl701-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6RZ-DBRH] [hereinafter How Can They Protect
Me?].
309
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, c. 20, 63B(3)(a), (U.K.)
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/pdfs/ukpga_20070020_en.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/GTT8-PMKV].
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well-being of the person to be protected.”310 In assessing the petitioner’s wellbeing, the court must consider the expressed wishes of the person to be protected, as appropriate given the petitioner’s age and level of understanding.311
Courts may include within the terms of FMPOs “such prohibitions, restrictions
or requirements . . . and . . . such other terms . . . as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of the order.”312 Common FMPO provisions include
prohibitions against facilitating, organizing, or permitting a marriage ceremony
to occur, and against applying for or using a passport to remove the petitioner
from the United Kingdom. Forced Marriage Protection Orders also can include
protections for third parties at risk of harm from one or more respondents, such
as a petitioner’s current or former dating partner.313 Although FMPOs may be
enforced through civil contempt or criminal prosecution,314 enforcement proceedings have been exceedingly rare.315
Enacting a version of FMPOs across the United States would have several
potential benefits for those facing forced marriages.
2. Forced Marriage as the Relationship
Forced marriage is a form of violence worthy of legal protection regardless
of the identity of the perpetrator. Unlike domestic violence, which is often an
ongoing campaign by one intimate partner or family member to control another, forced marriage can be a group effort. This group can include central persons in a petitioner’s life, such as parents and close relatives, as well as acquaintances and individuals a petitioner does not know well, such as an
intended spouse’s relatives. Moreover, like sexual assault and stalking, forced
marriage is a form of violence against women that both stems from and promotes the subordination of women and girls.316 Preventing and redressing
forced marriage in all contexts elevates the status of women and girls, and promotes equality.317 For all of these reasons, making FMPOs available against
310

Id. § 63A(2).
Id. § 63C(4)(c).
312
Id. § 63B(1).
313
Id. § 63B(3); see also Anne-Marie Hutchinson, Lessons for the US from UK Experiences
with Forced Marriage Protection Orders and Abusive Transnational Marriages, TAHIRIH
JUST. CENTER,(2013), http://preventforcedmarriage.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Less
ons-from-the-UK-on-FMPOs-and-Abusive-Intl-Marriages-with-Anne-Marie-Hutchinson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NM3T-QBSA].
314
How Can They Protect Me?, supra note 308; Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing
Act 2014, c. 12, § 63C(A) (U.K.).
315
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80; Nick McCarthy, Revealed: Police Secure
Court Orders to Protect Victims of Forced Marriage, BIRMINGHAM MAIL (Jan. 4, 2017 12:48
PM), https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/revealed-police-secure-courtorders-12403573 [https://perma.cc/5R3N-A4QP].
316
See supra Section I.E.
317
See supra Section I.E.
311
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any individual who is forcing or has forced another into a marriage would maximize the remedy’s efficacy.
3. Forced Marriage as the Conduct
A primary limitation of civil protection orders as a forced marriage remedy
lies in the primacy placed on individual acts in lieu of the broader dynamic.318
Protection order statutes require courts to parse respondents’ conduct to evaluate whether any individual actions crossed the legal threshold qualifying a petitioner for relief. This qualifying conduct test excludes individuals from relief
who have a qualifying relationship with a respondent, and legitimately fear they
are being forced into a marriage, but who have not been subjected to designated
tactics (or at least not yet) The limited data available on forced marriage in the
U.S. suggests that although physical violence is not rare, emotional and psychological tactics are far more prevalent.319 The focus on physical violence and
criminal conduct in many states may make legal protection unavailable to individuals who have suffered non-violent means of coercion. Legal protection is
perhaps similarly unavailable to those who have learned to act compliant after
witnessing violence against older siblings who attempted to resist marriage, and
thereby have avoided victimization themselves.
To best protect against forced marriage, the law must recognize forced
marriage as the harm to be prevented, whatever the tactics used to achieve that
end. Thus, a court’s inquiry must center on whether a forced marriage is at risk
or has occurred. “Force” should be defined broadly, to include emotional, psychological, and financial means of coercion, as well as acts and threats of physical and sexual violence. Because plans for an individual’s marriage may be
made years in advance of the marriage date, courts should be empowered to examine the totality of a respondent’s conduct over time when assessing whether
it amounts to “force.” This analysis should be undertaken from the perspective
of the petitioner, since whether a marriage is being forced upon an individual
fundamentally depends on that individual’s understanding of the events and his
or her own reaction to the plans (assuming that individual has some advanced
knowledge).320 Focusing on a petitioner’s experience also might help courts to
318

Some states encourage courts to consider the full context of a relationship in determining
whether particular allegations justify relief. See, e.g., Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927,
930 (D.C. 1991) (holding that courts should be apprised of the entire mosaic of the parties’
relationship, not just isolated incidents, when assessing whether good cause exists to extend
a CPO).
319
See supra Section I.D.
320
As stated by a young woman to a United Kingdom working group on forced marriage:
“A person knows when they are being forced into a marriage against their will—that must be
the starting point.” A CHOICE BY RIGHT, supra note 84, at 6. Adopting the petitioner’s perspective has similarly been suggested as a means of overcoming challenges to defining “coercion” or “coercive control” as actionable qualifying conduct in protection orders statutes,
given wide variations in the degree and subjective experience of control. GOODMARK, supra
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distinguish between arranged marriages and forced ones. To this end, FMPO
statutes should make actionable any intentional course of conduct causing a petitioner to experience force to marry, with the intent inquiry requiring a finding
that a respondent had a general intent to commit the acts that amount to force,
not a specific intent to force a marriage.321
In the domestic violence context, Professor Jeffrey Baker has argued for
the opposite approach. Professor Baker proposes that states expand qualifying
conduct in civil protection order statutes to include (non-criminal) coercion,
which is defined according to the goals behind a perpetrator’s conduct.322 Professor Baker’s approach is intended to avoid subjecting a petitioner to a potentially stigmatizing examination of the extent of her subordination.323 This aim is
worthy. In the FMPO context, however, requiring courts to find that a respondent had a specific intent to force a child into a marriage would risk prioritizing
the respondent’s own perception of his or her actions over the lived experiences
of the victim. Professor Baker’s proposal appears to preclude relief in the domestic violence context if a perpetrator does not view his or her motivations in
the manner ascribed.324 Professor Leigh Goodmark notes that although intent to
control has been widely ascribed to perpetrators of abuse, findings in the psychological and social science fields suggest that both those inflicting and subjected to domestic abuse do not necessarily identify control as a motivating
force in their experiences.325 This disconnect is likely to arise in the forced marriage context as well, as perpetrators of forced marriage reportedly often believe they are doing nothing wrong.326

note 119, at 48–49; Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 2, 11 (2007).
321
This proposed language builds from Professor Goodmark’s proposed alternative construction of actionable non-criminal coercion as qualifying conduct in domestic violence
protection order statutes. Professor Goodmark proposes to make actionable “any intentional
course of action that causes a petitioner to experience a loss of liberty, freedom, or autonomy” and limiting examination of the perpetrator’s intent to whether the conduct was intentional, regardless of its motivation. GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 50.
322
Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality
of Domestic Abuse, 11 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 58 (2008).
323
Id. at 59.
324
GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 48.
325
Id.
326
Alanen, supra note 11, at 12; see also, e.g., Marriage or Rape?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15,
1996, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/marriage-or-rape-175142 [https://perma.cc/G7
Y7-7FLU] (in case in which thirteen- and fourteen-year-old daughters were allegedly forced
to marry substantially older men in Nebraska, which resulted in the conviction of the husbands for rape and charges against the parents for child abuse and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the adults involved were reported to have believed they did nothing
wrong).
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4. Targeted Solutions
Forced Marriage Protection Orders should be structured to encourage
courts to order relief that addresses the specific circumstances facing the petitioner. Rather than mandate the inclusion of any particular remedies within
FMPOs, statutes should follow the common domestic violence protection order
model of listing possible remedies to help courts identify common needs. Such
remedies should include provisions prohibiting a respondent from enabling or
permitting a wedding to proceed, restricting travel, requiring the submission of
a petitioner’s passport to the court, prohibiting parents from applying for a
passport for a child, ordering the return of an individual who has been taken
abroad, limiting contact between the respondent and the petitioner, ordering a
respondent to stay away from a petitioner, prohibiting coercive or isolative
conduct, or mandating that a petitioner continue to attend school.327 To maximize FMPOs’ agility to respond to a victim’s particularized needs, statutes also
should authorize courts to make any other orders appropriate to the resolution
of the case.328 Maximizing the adaptability of FMPOs to the needs and interests
of each petitioner and encouraging courts to approach FMPOs as an individually tailored remedy could help to encourage more petitioners to seek relief.
5. Publicizing Relief
Individuals facing forced marriages often do not know that civil legal protections might be available to them.329 Legal and social service professionals
attempting to assist potential victims are also often unsure or unaware of the
potential for civil protection orders to provide relief.330 The ambiguity of existing laws as applied to forced marriage and minor petitioners only amplifies this
uncertainty.331 Uncertainty regarding the viability of protection orders to prevent forced marriage may discourage service providers from assisting potential
victims to seek relief because of concerns about the likelihood of success, lack
of organizational expertise, or alignment of the work with agency-mission or
grant-funding mandates.332 Creating a specialized forced marriage protection
order remedy (combined with a thoughtful public education campaign) would
inform potential victims, service providers, and others who seek to help that legal protections exist, as well as convey the state’s recognition of and commit327

Landau, supra note 11, at 50; Alanen, supra note 11, at 12–13; CHERYL THOMAS ET AL.,
DEVELOPING LEGISLATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS 378–79 (May 2011),
http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/modules/pdf/1355776748.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV9E7HLH].
328
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 75.
329
Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
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ment to redressing the problem, which could encourage grant funders and service organizations to expand their missions in turn.
B. Evolution
Many of the shortcomings of civil protection order statutes in the forced
marriage context have been identified as undermining the efficacy of the remedy to redress domestic violence as well.333 Addressing these issues in the forced
marriage context may permit states to test out new approaches on a smaller
scale that could support the evolution of civil protection order statutes to a
more victim-centered model.
1. Moving Away from the Criminal Paradigm
A number of scholars have noted that whereas social scientists have come
to understand domestic abuse as an ongoing campaign of coercive control334 or
intimate terrorism335 employed to dominate and entrap an intimate partner within the relationship, protection order statutes continue to define domestic violence by isolated acts of criminal conduct and physical violence.336 From a coercive control perspective, physical force represents one possible tool among
many non-criminal, non-violent tactics, all of which are aimed at establishing
control and domination over another individual. Physical violence may be a
component of a campaign of coercive control, but it is not necessary. It is the
broader, unified motivation of control and dominance that makes a relationship
abusive, rather than the use of particular tactics. The focus on individual actions
obscures the broader dynamic of the relationship and excludes from protection
individuals who are abused, disempowered, and subjugated in their relationships but not through tactics that meet the legal standard. Centering court inquiries on isolated actions also inadvertently results in the issuance of orders
against individuals who are primarily the targets of abuse within their relationships if they have used force or made threats upon occasion—whether to defend themselves or in the course of lashing out or asserting independence.337 In
333

GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 34–35; Johnson, supra note 201, at 1111.
334
Sociologist Evan Stark understands abuse as the employment of methods of coercion and
control by men to entrap and dominate women in intimate relationships. EVAN STARK,
COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE (2007).
335
Sociologist Michael Johnson defines intimate terrorism as a form of domestic violence in
which a range of tactics are used to establish power and control over an intimate partner.
MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008).
336
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 79; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 40; Johnson,
supra note 201, at 1111; Kuennen, supra note 320, at 20–21.
337
See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 75, 76 (2008).
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such cases, although an isolated act technically may satisfy the legal standard,
issuance of a protection order does not advance the state’s goal in combating
domestic violence, and it may undermine that goal by converting a protection
order into another weapon for a perpetrator to manipulate.338 The creation of an
FMPO remedy provides an opportunity to build a framework that focuses the
court’s inquiry on the broader dynamic at play.
2. Toward the Perspective of the Targeted
Although protection order statutes were developed to advance the interests
of individuals subjected to abuse, and the remedy has been recognized as the
most victim-centered available,339 the current structure of the protection order
remedy can subordinate the petitioner’s perspective and wishes. Defining domestic violence from a criminal law lens has focused protection order proceedings on the commission of particular acts rather than the total lived experience
of the petitioner. Scholars have argued that the standardization of public and
private systems’ response to domestic violence cases has directed attention
away from the particular circumstances of the individuals subjected to abuse.340
Such standardization manifests in the protection order context in limited definitions of qualifying “abuse”; limited, pre-defined remedies; and policies that
mandate arrest and “no-drop” prosecution of domestic violence offenses—
including violation of a protection order. Moreover, a number of scholars have
noted that the systemic response to domestic violence has prioritized separation
and safety at the expense of meeting the self-identified needs of those subjected
to abuse, including the need to stay connected with their communities and those
with whom they have intimate and familial relationships.341 The creation of
338

See Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 785–86 (D.C. 2008) (overturning a lower court order entering mutual civil protection orders against a petitioner and respondent upon a finding
that the respondent was the primary aggressor, and holding that a court is not obligated to
issue a civil protection order just because it finds that a qualifying offense occurred, instead,
civil protection orders only should be issued when doing so advances the purpose of the Intrafamily Offenses Act—to protect victims of abuse).
339
Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize
the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 307 (2011).
340
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 91; Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and
Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 191, 194 (2008).
341
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 96; SUSAN SCHECTER, EXPANDING SOLUTIONS
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND POVERTY: WHAT BATTERED WOMEN WITH ABUSED CHILDREN
NEED FROM THEIR ADVOCATES 7, 11 (2000); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered
Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009,
1019 (2000); Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1488–89; Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer?
Do We Know that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered
Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 19 (2004); Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV.
145, 146–47 (2015).
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FMPOs offers the chance to create an injunctive remedy that centers the court’s
inquiry and allocation of remedies on a petitioner’s experience and identified
needs.
3. Toward a Presumption of Access
Protection order statutes undermine their efficacy for minors by excluding
them from and restricting or failing to address the circumstances under which
minors can access relief. This is troubling, as minors are at significant risk for
abuse and frequently reluctant to seek adult intervention and support.342 In practice, ambiguity or silence regarding minors in protection order statutes may result in their exclusion from remedies, since courts and service providers who
are uncertain about minors’ eligibility for relief may turn minors away.343
Forced Marriage Protection Orders offer an opportunity to craft a remedy that
encourages minors to seek legal protection by explicitly extending standing to
all minors, and legal capacity to older minors to represent their own interests,
should they choose to do so. To ensure that minors who want the assistance of a
supportive adult in court proceedings can rely upon it, FMPOs also should
grant standing to a broadly construed class of adult representatives to seek orders on behalf of minors.344 To ensure that minors’ perspectives and wishes remain the focus in cases where adults represent minors’ interests, courts should
be required to solicit the minor petitioner’s perspective on whether an FMPO
should be issued and what remedies it should contain.345 When older minors
appear in court without adult representatives, courts should be authorized to
appoint attorneys to represent minors’ expressed interests in the proceeding.346
Empowering adolescents with the autonomy to control the pursuit of civil remedies to prevent their own forced marriages not only could encourage minors to
seek relief but also would advance state policies that enable minors to act in
their own interests to protect their safety, health, and welfare.347
342

Martin, supra note 105, at 459–60.
Id. at 508.
344
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)–(3) (2018) (permitting protection orders to be filed
on behalf of minor petitioners by “a parent, guardian, custodian, or other appropriate adult”).
345
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)–(3) (2018) (“[I]f a parent, guardian, custodian, or
other appropriate adult has petitioned for civil protection on behalf of a minor petitioner 12
years of age or older, the court shall consider the expressed wishes of the minor petitioner in
deciding whether to issue an order pursuant to this section and in determining the contents of
such an order.”). This approach also ensures that orders are sought on behalf of minors for
reasons consistent with the purpose of the remedy. See, e.g., Claver v. Wilbur, 280 S.W.3d
570, 570, 573 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing a civil protection order that a mother obtained on behalf of her sixteen-year-old daughter against the daughter’s boyfriend on the
grounds that “[t]he mere fact that [the minor’s] parents do not like appellant was not a proper
ground upon which to issue an order of protection”).
346
Martin, supra note 105, at 500.
347
Brustin, supra note 243, at 351 (highlighting the continuing discussion in state legislatures about when adolescents ought to be able to act autonomously); Jeruss, supra note 262,
343
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C. Circumspection
Several possible criticisms could be levied against the creation of forced
marriage protection orders.
1. Feasibility
Recent expansions of the civil protection order remedy to encompass
claims against stalking, harassment, and common partners has inundated some
domestic violence courtrooms with cases involving mundane disputes between
neighbors and love triangle jealousies that lack the coercive dynamics and intimate bonds that civil protection orders were intended to navigate.348 These
expansions and their aftermath may have created protection order fatigue and
could inspire a resistance to creating a new category of injunctive relief, particularly if at least some victims of forced marriage could seek relief under existing protection order statutes.
These experiences or general “floodgates” concerns should not discourage
enactment of forced marriage-specific relief. As both a form of violence in its
own right and a precursor to physical and sexual abuse, forced marriage should
be a problem of serious concern to states, and falls squarely within the range of
problems the protection order remedy was created to address. Although anecdotal evidence and the limited existing quantitative data point to forced marriage as a persistent problem, there are no indications that it is of a magnitude
that would overwhelm the courts. Investments in effective mechanisms to prevent forced marriage can mitigate and avoid significant harms to individuals
and future offspring, and associated costs to states.
2. Enforceability
Civil protection orders have proved an effective remedy, in part, because of
their robust enforceability. Protection orders generally are enforceable through
at 895 (detailing the passage of mature-minor statutes in recent years and noting that “[a]ll of
these statutes have converged on the idea that there are certain areas where minors need protection from harm. In these areas, minors are granted the rights to make important decisions
without notifying their parents”); see Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My Mom! A Minor’s Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 444 (2011) (observing that in the
context of healthcare, teens are deterred from seeking treatment for sexually transmitted infections by fear of disclosure, leading states to eliminate parental-consent requirements for
such treatment); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care:
Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 92–93 (2001) (discussing how state legislatures have lowered or eliminated the age at which teens may consent to treatment in an effort to encourage teens to access mental-health services); Susan D.
Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2123 (1996) (explaining that matureminor medical statutes encourage minors to seek medical care that they would not if parental
consent were needed).
348
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018).
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civil and criminal contempt proceedings, and violations of protection orders also often constitute a distinct criminal offense.349 The full faith and credit requirement of the federal Violence Against Women Act ensures that protection
orders are enforceable across state lines.350
In light of the common resistance to criminal prosecution of those facing
forced marriages and the historical ineffectiveness of criminal laws at penalizing forced marriage, states should think carefully about whether to similarly
criminalize violations of forced marriage protection orders. If FMPO violations
are criminalized, such offenses should not be subject to mandatory arrest and
no drop prosecution policies, which could strongly deter use of the FMPO remedy, especially among immigrant communities.
It might be argued that failing to criminalize FMPO violations would set up
FMPOs as a “lesser” form of protection order, thereby sending the message that
forced marriage is a “lesser” form of domestic abuse.351 Others might object
that vesting control over enforcement in the petitioner leaves the petitioner vulnerable to a respondent’s attempts to persuade or coerce her to dismiss enforcement proceedings.352 Some might also question the efficacy of protection
orders if petitioners have sole enforcement discretion and a reluctance to exercise that right.353 Yet, the history of forced marriage prosecution in the U.S. and
the U.K. to date suggests that criminalization efforts may have more symbolic
than practical value.354 Moreover, in light of the common need for emergency
349

PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATIONS MATRIX, NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL
FAITH & CREDIT (2014), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/protection_order_viola
tions_matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7TD-PRAU]; David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1194 (1995); Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 1101-02.
350
18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012). See generally FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION
ORDERS: ASSISTING SURVIVORS WITH ENFORCEMENT ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL LINES, NAT’L
CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, http://www.bwjp.org/assets/docu
ments/pdfs/ffc_advocate_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHR3-UYAF] [Hereinafter FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION ORDERS].
351
Cf. RUTH GAFFNEY-RHYS, REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS: FORCED MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND AND WALES: CHALLENGES, ACHIEVEMENTS,
BEST PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION GAPS (2013).
352
A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16; HOME OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE
CONSULTATION, (2011) [hereinafter FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION]; HOME OFFICE,
FORCED MARRIAGE: A CONSULTATION—SUMMARY OF RESPONSES (2012); Robert F. Friedman, Protecting Victims from Themselves, but Not Necessarily from Abusers: Issuing a NoContact Order over the Objection of the Victim-Spouse, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235
(2010).
353
FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION, supra note 352, at 6 (noting that from Nov. 2008 to
Dec. 2011 only five FMPO breaches reported, and only one civil contempt proceeding was
brought for a violation).
354
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON FORCED MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOME
RECOMMENDATIONS, SAVE YOUR RIGHTS 10 (2011), http://www.saveyourrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/SYR-REPORT-as-printed.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVD3-74ZX] (noting that need for cooperation of forced marriage victim may make value of forced marriage
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intervention, such as when forced marriage is imminent, it is critical that preventive policies are designed to encourage individuals to come forward and
seek assistance. Separating FMPOs from possible criminal penalties eliminates
a possible barrier to seeking relief. Finally, electing not to criminalize FMPO
violations would not immunize perpetrators from criminal penalties. Even if
FMPO violations themselves are not criminalized, any violation that constitutes
another criminal offense, such as assault, threats, or stalking, would be grounds
for prosecution in its own right.
Furthermore, to ensure FMPOs have a deterrent effect on respondents,
FMPOs should be enforceable through criminal and civil contempt proceedings
initiated by the petitioner. The Violence Against Women Act’s definition of
“protection” order is sufficiently broad that its full faith and credit provisions
should encompass FMPOs, and thereby ensure that FMPO petitioners remain
protected when they cross state lines.355
3. Desirability
Some might also object that the legal system should not be looked to as a
primary solution for forced marriage. A number of scholars have argued that
“overreliance on the legal system has stunted the development” of other means
of addressing the problem.356 A similar emphasis on developing effective legal
interventions may funnel resources away from the development of creative
non-legal interventions.357
It is also not clear whether those who could be eligible for FMPOs would
pursue them in significant numbers. During the first thirty months when
FMPOs were available in the United Kingdom, only 339 FMPOs were granted,
criminal offense, like the female genital mutilation criminal offense, of greater symbolic than
practical value).
355
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A)(2012) (“protection order includes . . . any injunction, restraining
order, or any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication
with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or final order issued
by a civil or criminal court whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente
lite order in another proceeding so long as any civil or criminal order was issued in response
to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection. . . .”);
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2012) (“Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection
(b) of this section by the court of one State, Indian tribe, or territory (the issuing State, Indian
tribe, or territory) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State, Indian
tribe, or territory (the enforcing State, Indian tribe, or territory) and enforced by the court and
law enforcement personnel of the other State, Indian tribal government or Territory as if it
were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.”). See generally FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR
PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 350, at 3.
356
GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 6; see also GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 74.
Professor Margaret Johnson has argued that domestic violence interventions also have been
dominated by a focus on short-term safety, as defined by the state, to the detriment of the
long-term security of individuals subjected to abuse. Johnson, supra note 341, at 165.
357
Johnson, supra note 341, at 157.
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despite estimates that 5,000 to 8,000 forced marriages occur and the government’s Forced Marriage Unit fields approximately 1,700 calls for assistance
annually.358 Yet, the number of orders sought far exceeded initial expectations
that “there would be between 5 and 50 application a year.”359 The same concerns about harming or bringing shame upon family members that make criminal intervention undesirable might deter those facing forced marriages from approaching the legal system under any circumstances. Reluctance to approach
the justice system may be amplified for members of immigrant communities in
the United States as a result of recent policies promoting enforcement operations.360 Finally, some might be concerned that creating policies to address
forced marriage could stigmatize communities in which forced marriage is a
problem, in some cases compounding existing challenges faced by religious
and cultural minorities.361
These are important concerns but none should deter the creation of
FMPOs. At present, no readily accessible remedy exists that can be relied upon
to prevent a forced marriage. Only a small number of states enable intervention
into a forced marriage where the coercion at play has not manifested in acts or
threats of physical violence. Thus, the establishment of an FMPO remedy creates a benefit for those facing forced marriage no matter how infrequently the
remedy is used, because it will offer legal relief to individuals who otherwise
may have no viable legal remedy. The likelihood that the remedy may be infrequently used brings the potential benefit of not imposing a significant additional burden on court resources.
To encourage use of the remedy by those who could benefit, states should
undertake education campaigns to inform the community about FMPOs—
taking care to frame the problem across a range of contexts—and simultaneously raise awareness about the problem of forced marriage and the rights of individuals to choose their own spouses. Community organizations could also part358

FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION, supra note 352, at 6; GAFFNEY-RHYS, supra note
351.
359
Teertha Gupta & Khatun Sapnara, The Law, the Courts, and Their Effectiveness, in
FORCED MARRIAGE, INTRODUCING A SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 159
(Aisha K. Gill & Sundari Anitha eds. 2011) (“In part, the [Forced Marriage Protection] Act
was intended to have symbolic as much as practical force (i.e. a deterrent effect) in order to
raise awareness.”).
360
Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of Reporting Crimes,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/23/
undocumented-immigrants-wary-report-crimes-deportation [https://perma.cc/2LUA-FQD5];
Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexualabuse.html [https://perma.cc/R2E2-DPWM]; Maya Rhodan, Deportation Fears Silence
Some Domestic Violence Victims, TIME (May 30, 2017), http://www.time.com/4798422/
domestic-violence-deportation-immigration [https://perma.cc/HVE5-CCYU].
361
A CHOICE BY RIGHT, supra note 84, at 12 (“The Working Group is clear that the issue of
forced marriage should not be used to stigmatise any community.”).
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ner with community members to organize around the problem and identify
common needs and workable interventions. Rather than relying on FMPOs as a
one-size-fits-all solution, state governments and private foundations should invest in research to better understand the scope of the problem and the needs of
those subjected to it, and should dedicate funding to programs committed to
developing creative responses to address the needs identified.362
CONCLUSION
Forced marriage is a serious form of violence that the United States is currently failing to address. Yet, its widespread existence should be a call to political action. Given the enduring harms suffered by those forced into marriages
and the challenges of securing the return of persons taken abroad against their
will, efforts to combat the problem should prioritize prevention. Civil protection orders provide the best opportunity for relief under existing laws, and they
are an appropriate and workable remedy for some facing forced marriage today.
But, the general viability of civil protection orders to prevent forced marriage
varies widely across states, particularly for minors. Adults being coerced by
parents, other relatives, or household members through acts and threats of
physical violence, stalking, or harassment are best positioned to secure relief
through civil protection orders. Minors who are being coerced through emotional, psychological, and financial means as well as those being coerced by intended spouses or other third parties face a harder road and may be excluded
from the remedy in many states.
States must recognize forced marriage itself as the harm to be prevented
and combatted. The creation of specialized forced marriage protection orders
would make legal protection more accessible and responsive to the needs of
those facing forced marriages. Moreover, taking this step offers states the opportunity to implement lessons learned in the domestic violence context and
refine the protection order remedy to redress past concerns. To maximize their
utility to prevent forced marriage, FMPOs should focus the legal inquiry on the
experience of the petitioner, define actionable harm according to the dynamics
of the problem (rather than the criminal code), accord minors a clear path to legal relief, and grant courts the latitude to order creative solutions. Legal remedies are a last resort for those facing forced marriages and should not be relied
upon as an isolated strategy to address the problem. Government and private
resources should be devoted to studying the extent and nature of the problem
and understanding the needs and interventions desired by those facing it. Such
362

Lack of information about the problem of forced marriage is an obstacle to an effective
response to the problem in the United States. The U.K. previously faced this same challenge.
Id. (“The Working Group has found that there is a lack of reliable data on the cases of forced
marriage, and that this lack of information has been a barrier to: recognition of the problem,
getting commitment to tackling it, securing the right skills and resources to take effective
action, [and] planning the provision of services for victims.”).
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data along with collaborative efforts with impacted communities should guide
the development of additional preventive strategies.
It was not too long ago that all fifty states created civil protection orders to
prevent and intervene in domestic abuse because existing remedies were an incomplete fit to address the problem. Today, the emergence of another significant threat to individual autonomy, health, and well-being calls for a similar,
unified state response and a new generation of protection orders targeted to restrain forced marriage.
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D.C.371
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Other
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perpetrators of repeat
violence

* This chart tracks only relationships potentially relevant to circumstances of forced marriage, and omits relationships, such as sharing a child in common, less likely to apply to individuals seeking protection from forced marriage.
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ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1, 30-5-2 (2017).
364
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.850, 18.66.990 (2017).
365
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1809, 13-3601(A) (2017).
366
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017).
367
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6210, 6211, 6301 (West 2018); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2018).
368
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018).
369
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-15, 46b-16a, 46b-38a (2017).
370
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901, 1041 (2017).
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D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018).
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FLA. STAT. §§ 741.28, 784.046, 784.0485 (2017).
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IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017).
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IND. CODE §§ 34-6-2-44.8, 34-6-2-34.5 (2017).
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IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1998).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102, 60-31a04 (2017).
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those who unlawfully
distribute sexual images of or engage in sex
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dissemination of private sexual images
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17 and
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MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010, 455.020, 455.505 (2017).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-102, 45-5-206 (2017).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.02, 28-311.09, 42-903 (2017).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.018, 200.378, 200.591 (2017).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1, 633:3-a (2017).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:12-10.2, 2C:14-14, 2C:25-19 (West 2017).
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N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812, 822 (McKinney 2018).
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OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 60.1, 60.2 (2017).

Oklahoma399

388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399

Other
Relatives

Dating or
Intimate
Partners

17 and
older

Stalkers

17 and older

Sexual Assailants

Fiancés
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perpetrators of assault

those deemed to have a
sufficient relationship,
perpetrators of human
trafficking

State
Oregon400
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Rhode Island402
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South Dakota404
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Spouses

if against
adult
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16 and older

16 and older

Other Relatives
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adult

13 and
older

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.866, 107.705, 107.726, 163.763 (2018).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2018).
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.2-2, 15-15-1 (2017).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1750, 20-4-20 (2017).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-19A-8, 25-10-3.1 (2017); Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 870–71 (S.D. 1997).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017).
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.003-6, 71.0021, 82.002(West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7A.01 (West 2017).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-3a-101, 78B-7-102, 78B-7-402 (West 2017).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5131, tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1103 (West 2017).
VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-228, 16.1-243, 19.2-152.9 (West 2017).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.90.030, 7.92.020, 7.92.040, 26.50.010 (2017).

Washington410

400
401
402
403
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405
406
407
408
409
410

Stalkers

Sexual Assailants

Other
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perpetrators of certain
crimes of violence or
physical assault resulting in injury

perpetrators of act of
violence, force, or
threat

State

West Virginia411

Wisconsin412

Parents

16 and
older

Spouses

CoHabitants

16 and older

W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-204, 53-8-4 (2017).
WIS. STAT. §§ 813.12, 813.125 (2017).
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-507, 35-21-102, 35-21-103 (2017).

Wyoming413

411
412
413

Other Relatives
Fiancés

Dating or
Intimate
Partners

Stalkers

Sexual Assailants

Other

989

perpetrators of repeated credible threats of
bodily injury
perpetrators of physical abuse
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APPENDIX 2: QUALIFYING ADULT REPRESENTATIVES DESIGNATED BY PROTECTION ORDER STATUTES
Legal
guardian
or custodian
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Any appropriate/
responsible adult

“unless the court determines otherwise”

* This chart summarizes only statutory provisions that designate adult representatives. Italics indicate that a statute is silent on this topic. In some states, judicial bench books and court rules provide additional guidance on this topic.
414
ALA. CODE § 30-5-5 (2017).
415
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.66.100, 18.65.850 (2017).
416
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(A) (2017).
417
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (2017).
418
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (b) (West 2018).
419
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-14-103, 13-14-108, 26-31.-102 (2018).
420
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15 (2017).
421
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2017).
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D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1003 (2018).
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FLA. STAT. §§ 784.046, 784.0485 (2017).
424
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3 (2017).
425
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (West 2017).
IDAHO CODE § 39-6304 (2017).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018).
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Other
Relative
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Next
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IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2 (2017).
IOWA CODE § 236.3 (2017).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104 (2017).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (West 2018).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133 (2017).
ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4005 (2017).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (West 2018).
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2017).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7 (2017).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2017).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-14 (West 2017).
N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 822 (Consol. 2018); Hamm-Jones v. Jones, 788 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (a parent may file on behalf of a child).
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Any appropriate/
responsible adult

if on the court’s own
motion

State

North Carolina440

North Dakota441

Ohio442
Oklahoma443
Oregon
Pennsylvania444
Rhode Island
South Carolina445
South Dakota

Parent

custodial
parent

for disorderly
conduct
orders

Legal
guardian
or custodian

for disorderly conduct
orders

CoHabitant

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-2, 50C-2 (2017).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2017).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.214, 3113.31(West 2017).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 60.2 (2017).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106 (2018).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (2017).
TENN. CODE Ann. § 36-3-602 (2017).

Tennessee446

440
441
442
443
444
445
446

Other
Relative

Prosecutor
or law enforcement

State Child
Welfare
Agency

Domestic
violence
program

but not
against a
parent or
guardian

Next
friend

Guardian
ad litem
or attorney
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Any appropriate/
responsible adult

for civil no contact
orders to redress
sexual assault/stalking

State

Texas447

Utah448
Vermont449
Virginia
Washington450

West Virginia451

Wisconsin

Parent

for sexual assault
orders

Legal
guardian
or custodian

for stalking
orders

for sexual
assault orders

CoHabitant

for stalking orders
against
nonparent

Other
Relative

Prosecutor
or law enforcement

for stalking
and sexual
assault orders

TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 82.002 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01 (West 2017).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3a-101 (West 2017).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5131, tit. 15, § 1103 (West 2017).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.90.030, 7.92.040, 26.50.020 (2017).
W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-204, 48-27-305, 53-8-3 (2017).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-507 (2017).
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Any appropriate/
responsible adult

for domestic violence orders

for sexual assault
protection orders
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APPENDIX 3: QUALIFYING CONDUCT
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×
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Emotional
Abuse

×

×

×

×

* This chart aggregates the types of conduct that may trigger a claim for a protection order across all protection order categories and all qualifying relationships in each jurisdiction. The types of
conduct that justify relief may vary according to the relationship between the parties or the type of protection order sought (e.g., stalking may not justify the issuance of a domestic violence protection order, but may justify the issuance of a stalking protection order in a particular jurisdiction).
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ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A) (2017).
456
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017).
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×

Stalking or
Harassment

Physical Violence

Iowa468
Kansas469
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

State

Kentucky470

×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

Louisiana471
Maine472
Maryland473
Massachusetts474
Michigan475
Minnesota476
Mississippi477
Missouri478
Montana479
Nebraska480
Nevada481
New
Hampshire482
×

IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018).
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2132, 46:2151 (2017).
ME. STAT. tit. 19a, § 4002 (2017).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (West 2018).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A § 1, 258E § 1 (2017).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2018).
MINN. STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748 (2017).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017).
MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2017).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.02, 42-903, (2017).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2017).

New Jersey483
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483

“Other
Crimes”

×

×

×

×
×

Coercion/Restraint
of Liberty

×
×

Child Endangerment

×
×

×

×
×

×

×
×
×

995

Emotional
Abuse

×

North Carolina486
North Dakota487

New York485

New Mexico484

×
×

×

×

×

×

Physical Violence

×

×
×

×

×

Threats (Violent)

×
×
×

×

×
×

×

×

×

Sexual
Abuse/
Assault
×

×
×
×

×

×
×

×

×

×

×

Stalking or
Harassment

Ohio488
Oklahoma489
×
×
×
×

×
×
×

State

Oregon490
×
×
×
×
×
×

×

×
×
×

×

×
×
×

×

Pennsylvania491
Rhode Island492
South Carolina493
South Dakota494
Tennessee495
Texas496

×

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2018).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 812 (McKinney 2018).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50C-1 (2017).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2017).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.031, 3113.31, (West 2017).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1117; 22 § 60.1 (2017).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.86, 107.705, 163.760, 163.763 (2018).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2018).
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1750, 20-4-20 (2017).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(9) (2017).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601, 36-3-602 (2017).
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 71.004 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7A.01 (West 2017).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-36-1, 78B-7-102, 78B-7-201, 78B-7-402 (West 2017).

Utah497
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497

“Other
Crimes”

×

×

Coercion/Restraint
of Liberty

Child Endangerment

×

Emotional
Abuse

996

×

×

×

×

×

×

×
“forcing or coercing a child
into a marriage”

×

×

×

×

State

Physical Violence

×
×
×
×

Threats (Violent)

×
×

Sexual
Abuse/
Assault
×
×
×
×
×
×

×
×

Stalking or
Harassment

×
×
×
×
×
×

×

×
×

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (West 2017).
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (West 2017).
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017).
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2017).
WIS. STAT. §§ 48.02, 813.12, 813.125 (2017).
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-507, 35-21-102 (2017).

Vermont498
Virginia499
Washington500
West
Virginia501
Wisconsin502
Wyoming503

498
499
500
501
502
503

“Other
Crimes”

×

Coercion/Restraint
of Liberty

×
×

Child Endangerment

×

997

Emotional
Abuse

×

Louisiana
Maine
Minnesota

D.C.

California

State
Alabama
Arkansas

LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2132, 46:2133 (2017).
ME. STAT. tit. 19a, §§ 4002, 4005 (2017).
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2017).

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (b)(1) (West
2018).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1003 (2018).

Statute
ALA. CODE § 30-5-5 (2017).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (2017).

Oklahoma

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.763 (2018).

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-19, 2C:25-28
(West 2017).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 142A-4 (2017).
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Minors who are emancipated by marriage, pregnancy, having a child, military service, or court order have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Minors sixteen and seventeen and emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within in all qualifying relationships.
Minors twelve and older have capacity to seek sexual abuse protection orders against non-family or household
members over eighteen years of age.
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Statute silent but Supreme Court held that where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult representative, trial courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no guardian is necessary or permit the minor to proceed alone.
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Minors of any age have capacity to seek relief against dating partners, minors seventeen and older have capacity to seek relief against sexual assailants.
Minors sixteen and older and emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief against spouses, those with
whom they live “as if a spouse,” relatives (excluding parents and minor siblings), those with whom they share
a child in common (born and unborn), and household members.

Explanation
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Married and unmarried minors denied capacity to seek relief.
Minors twelve and older have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships in domestic violence,
harassment, and workplace violence protection orders.
Minors twelve and older have capacity to seek relief against spouses, those with whom they have a child in
common, and dating partners; minors sixteen and older also have capacity to seek relief against relatives, cohabitants, and common partners. Unclear whether minors have capacity to seek relief against stalkers and sexual assailants.
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Minors sixteen and older have capacity to seek relief against current or former spouses and persons with whom
they have a child in common
Minors who have been emancipated by marriage have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Minors seventeen and older and emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.
Minors of any age have capacity to seek relief against current and former intimate partners and spouses.

APPENDIX 4: STATE PROTECTION ORDER STATUTES EXPLICITLY ADDRESSING LEGAL CAPACITY OF MINORS

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-3, 93-21-7
(2017).
MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017).

Missouri

Oregon

23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106 (2018).
Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868,
870–71 (S.D. 1997).

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:7 (2017).

Pennsylvania
South Dakota

New Hampshire
New Jersey

Tennessee
Texas
Utah

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017).
TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01
(West 2017).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-7-102, 78B-7-103
(West 2017).

West Virginia

Washington

Vermont

Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569,
576–577 (W. Va. 2006).

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.020 (2017).

VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, § 5131, tit. 15,
§ 1103 (West 2017).
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Minors of any age have capacity to seek relief against dating partners. Minors sixteen and older have capacity
to seek relief within any qualifying relationship for abuse prevention orders and against stalkers/sexual assailants.
Minors sixteen and older have capacity to seek relief against parents, grandparents, those with whom they
share a child in common, dating partners, and cohabitants with whom they have had a dating relationship.
Statute silent but state Supreme Court held that minors have capacity to file for domestic violence protection
orders against all qualifying relationships.

*State
Alabama505
Alaska506
Arizona507
Arkansas508
California509
Colorado510
Connecticut511
Delaware512
D.C.513
Florida514
Georgia515
Hawaii516
Idaho517
Illinois518
Indiana519

Parents

Spouses

Other Relatives

Fiancés

Dating
Partners

Stalkers

APPENDIX 5: ADULT QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIPS CHART
CoHabitants

Sexual Assailants

Other

1000

* This chart tracks only relationships potentially relevant to circumstances of forced marriage, and omits relationships, such as sharing a child in common, unlikely to apply to individuals seeking
protection from forced marriage.
505
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017).
506
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.850, 18.66.990 (2017).
507
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1809, 13-3601(A); (2017).
508
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017).
509
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6210, 6211 (West 2017), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2017).
510
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018).
511
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-15, 46b-16a, 46b-38a (2017).
512
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901, 1041 (2017).
513
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018).
514
FLA. STAT. §§ 741.28, 784.046, 784.0485 (2017).
515
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-94, 19-13-1 (2017).
516
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (West 2017).
517
IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017).
518
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21/180, 22/201, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018).
IND. CODE §§ 34-6-2-44.8, 34-6-2-34.5 (2017).
519

State
Iowa520
Kansas521
Kentucky522
Louisiana523
Maine524

Maryland525
Massachusetts526
Michigan527
Minnesota528

Mississippi529
Missouri530
Montana531

Parents

Spouses

CoHabitants

only intimate
partners

Other Relatives

Fiancés

Dating
Partners

IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102, 60-31a04 (2017).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.720, 456.010, 456.030 (West 2018).
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2132, 46:2173 (2017).
ME. STAT. tit. 19-a §§ 4002, 4005 (2017).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROCEEDINGS § 3-1503 (West 2018).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A § 1, 209A § 3, ch. 258E § 1 (2017).
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.2950, 600.2950a (2018).
MINN. STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748 (2017).
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-3, 93-21-7 (2017).
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010, 455.020 (2017).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-102, 45-5-206 (2017).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.02, 28-311.09, 42-903 (2017).

Nebraska532
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532

Stalkers

Sexual Assailants

Other

1001

those who unlawfully distribute sexual images of or engage in sex trafficking of petitioner
perpetrators of certain listed
crimes

perpetrators of assault, dissemination of private sexual
images

perpetrators of assault

State
Nevada533
New
Hampshire534
New Jersey535

New Mexico536
New York537
North
Carolina538
North Dakota539
Ohio540
Oklahoma541
Oregon542

Parents

Spouses

CoHabitants

NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.018, 200.378, 200.591 (2017).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1, 633:3-a (West 2017).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:12-10.1, 2C:14-14, 2C:25-19 (West 2017).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (West 2018).
N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812, 822 (McKinney 2018).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1, 50B-2, 50C-1, 50C-2 (2017).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-31.2-01, 14-07.1-01, 14-07.1-02 (2017).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.214, 3113.31 (West 2017).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 60.1, 60.2 (2017).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.866, 107.705, 107.726, 163.763 (2018).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2018).

Pennsylvania543
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543

Other Relatives

Fiancés

Dating
Partners

Stalkers

requires
conviction

Sexual Assailants

Other

1002

those deemed to have a sufficient relationship

State

Rhode Island544

South
Carolina545
South Dakota546

Tennessee547
Texas548
Utah549
Vermont550
Virginia551
Washington552
West Virginia553
Wisconsin554

Parents

Spouses

CoHabitants

Other Relatives

only if
one
party is
a minor

Fiancés

only if one
party is a
minor

Dating Partners

11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.2-2, 15-15-1 (West 2017).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1750, 20-4-20 (2017).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-19A-8, 25-10-3.1 (2017).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017).
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.003-6, 71.0021, 82.002 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 7A.01 (West 2017).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-3a-101, 78B-7-102, 78B-7-402 (West 2017).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5131, tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1103 (West 2017).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, 19.2-152.9 (West 2017).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.90.030, 7.92.020, 7.92.040, 26.50.010 (2017).
W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-204, 53-8-4 (2017).
WIS. STAT. §§ 813.12, 813.125 (2017).
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-507, 35-21-102, 35-21-103 (2017).

Wyoming555
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555

Stalkers

Sexual Assailants

Other

1003

perpetrator of certain crimes
of violence or physical assault resulting in injury

perpetrators of act of violence, force, or threat

perpetrators of threats of bodily injury
perpetrators of physical abuse
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